Anticipated visits of the PM, as well as Ministers of Natural Resources, Agriculture, Defence, Trade and Environment…letter to Prime Minister re the AECL reactors at Qinshan…Year Zero in China and impact on the Canada/China relationship…Lai Changxing: the long legal battle over his extradition to China, and the outcome…
Mission Agenda Meeting, followed by various staff meetings.
This was going to be yet another busy year. At the top political level, we project a PM Chrétien visit; Ministers Dhaliwal/Natural Resources (with a visit to Qinshan possible), VanClief/Agriculture, Defence/Graham, Pettigrew/Trade and Anderson/Environment. Of course, each of these projected visits could be postponed or cancelled, or others added. Nor could anticipate if/when a Prime Minister decides to make changes to his or her Cabinet.
Luncheon meeting with David Wang, re expanding school and higher education linkages between Nova Scotia and Nanjing and vicinity. David would a few years later receive an award from the Premier of Nova Scotia for his work.
Dinner with Australian Ambassador David Irvine.
Following his retirement, David wrote two books, one based on the Mahabharata, the ur-Indian classic – and a second on Javanese wayang music. He possessed an extraordinary intellect…and art collection, as I recall.
Transmittal of a letter from Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to President Zhang Zemin informing him of the retirement of Judd Buchanan as Chairman of the Canadian Tourism Commission and his replacement by Charles Lapointe, also conveying his understanding that Approved Destination Status to Canada is close to being granted.
As mentioned earlier, it would take almost a decade..December 2009 for formal granting of ADS, with the first Chinese tour groups arriving in August 2010, for the Canadian tourism industry to benefit from ADS….and then it would be lost over the Meng Wanzhou/Two Micheals crisis of December 2018….and then regained following a meeting between Prime Minister Carney and President Xi Jinping in November 2025.
Continuing with staff meetings, each dealing with 2003 programs.
Note to the MFA conveying a letter from PM Chrétien to CCP Secretary General Hu Jintao, looking forward to a meeting at a mutually convenient occasion, and the continuing goodwill, mutual benefit and deepening friendship between Canada and China.
Note to MFA conveying a letter from PM Chrétien to President Zhang Zemin congratulating him and Shanghai for being chosen as the host city for Expo 2010.
Letter to Beijing-based Naga Group Managing Director Laurence Brahm. Given that his TV program production company was seeking outlets in Canada, I introduce him to the Banff and Hot Docs Canadian International Documentary festivals, as well as CBC, CTV and Canwest Global.
Lettre adressée au Sous-Ministre Michel Dorais, Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada, exprimant une inquiétude à l’égard de la nouvelle législation sur l’immigration, qui réoriente les objectifs en matière d’immigration vers le Canada, focalisant excessivement – selon moi – sur les connaissances linguistiques – anglaise et française. Cela risque une chute précipitée de demandes d’immigration de la Chine. La réduction progressive du cadre sino-canadien parmi la population nous risque de perdre l’un des plus gros atouts de notre relation bilatérale. Je demande au Sous-Ministre de surveillez l’impact de cette législation ainsi que les mesures législatives, afin de ne pas nuire aux bénéfices que l’immigration chinoise nous apporte.
Hosted dinner for visiting Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ward Elcock, along with other guests, including Ambassador Irvine.
It’s still the outset of the New Year, so the Mission Agenda Meeting was followed by a walk-about the Embassy to wish everyone the best for 2003.
Annual Leave, January 6 to 21.
I addressed a letter to PM Chrétien, providing a report on recent developments in Qinshan and the AECL reactors. It doesn’t have a ‘Confidential’ transmission slip and I wrote it, so I am providing the text as sent. It does not reveal any state secrets!
Dear Prime Minister,
I am pleased to inform you that during the last few days, the first of the two CANDU Qingshan reactors has passed its ‘100 Hours’ test, and has been transferred to its Chinese buyer, the China National Nuclear Corporation. This took place 38 days ahead of schedule and under budget.
During the official transfer ceremony on Sunday, attended by our Consul General, Mr. Stewart Beck, Chinese officials went out of their way to compliment you for your personal involvement in the launch and realization of this project, by far one of the defining initiatives in the Canada-China relationship. It also anticipates, by a few months, the transfer of the second reactor unit, expected in the fall. I can say in all honesty that without your continuing interest in this project, including your visit in 2001, it would simply not have gotten off the ground, and achieved the results that we now celebrate.
It is equally clear that nuclear power will continue to have a place in China’s energy strategy. It is less certain that CANDU will play a part, in the absence of strong and continuing Canadian commitment to cooperation. Qingshan’s performance in the coming months and years will be one determinant of CANDU’s future in China. But so will be a continued high level of engagement under your political leadership and that of your Cabinet. AECL and the CANDU technology must remain a viable part of our relationship with the Chinese. A ceremony marking the formal acceptance of the unit is being planned by the AECL/Chinese partnership on April 14, with China’s new leadership invited. I believe it is extremely important that Canada be represented at that event by one of your Cabinet colleagues. We are working towards that outcome.
In closing, Prime Minister, allow me to thank you personally for your engagement on this file. I hope I will have the privilege of welcoming you back in China in the not-too-distant future. You are a valued friend of China. The China-Canada relationship will continue to benefit from your guidance, particularly at this important juncture, when so many of China’s leaders are changing.
My best wishes to you and your family in the New Year,
Cordially,
Joseph Caron
Ambassador
Given that a new year was aborning, I gave a lot of thought to what it would mean for China – which I decided to call Year Zero – and the attendant impact on our bilateral relationship.
Why Year Zero? Because it was the year when China would integrate new Party leadership and put into place a new governing State Council that was tasked to manage economic development and its numerous challenges. As is the case in a political as opposed to legally defined milieux, the new team would have to assert itself and avoid being pushed aside by the Third Generation Party stalwarts that had recently left the scene. The State Council would also determine whether China’s growth under policies still in place would be sustainable. Importantly, the New Year would see how China would begin to implement its socially and economically charged WTO commitments, especially in agriculture where nearly half of China’s workers – 330,000,000 – would be on the front line of their impact. Another challenge is stabilizing a very immature and shaky financial system, with Non-Performing Loans – NPLs, since they had earned their own acronym – at 35% of corporate assets and over 55% of GDP. Internationally, China would face, from the Korean Peninsula and its far West, from Central Asia to Iraq, an ever-complex international environment in which to sustain its ‘economy first’ foreign policy. That said, some challenges in the New Year were the same as those of 2002: demonstrating through results that its development model could be maintained and legitimacy sustained without addressing serious inadequacies in political, legal, regulatory and administrative governance, and do so absent the public input which underlies stability and legitimacy of the democratic variety.
It was also Year Zero in the Canada-China relationship. In the Peoples Republic of China, politics is everything. To have effect, linkages were and remain primarily personal, not institutional. As true two decades later as it was in 2003, the Communist Party of China reaches down into everything, including the management of relatively minor bilateral irritants. Unless Canada had and maintained political networks and guanxi in place to horse trade obligations and favours, we would lack some of the most important tools needed to promote Canada’s agenda and clear obstacles to its achievement. In this, personal relationships were important. I noted also that China was about to surpass Japan as Canada’s third most significant trading partner, after the US and the EU. This made well-oiled, personal and effective diplomacy all the more important.
I was confident that China would keep its place as the world’s 6th largest economy, with the GDP of US$1.3 trillion – in fact, it came in at $1.66T. GDP growth had averaged 9% per annum over the last decade, and was projected at 7.5% for ’03, when in fact it reached about 10%. China was already the world’s 4th largest manufacturer – following the US, Japan and Germany. It manufactured 50% of the world’s cameras, 30% of its TVs and air conditioners, 25% of washing machines, 20% of refrigerators. One company in Guangdong was producing 40% of microwave ovens sold in the EU. All this Made-in-China stuff backed $600B in two-way trade anticipated for 2003. At over US$260B, China had accumulated the world’s second largest foreign exchange reserves. And more was coming, as an anticipated $50B in Foreign Direct Investment would flow into China in the coming year.
Still, I thought at the time that while these growth numbers were undisputably impressive, they alone had not managed to solve all of China’s problems. Extensive polling – there has long been polling in China contracted by the CCP to know what its citizens think, and one of my key contacts ran one of the favored polling companies – revealed that millions of Chinese citizens faced a variety of problems: access to social security, steady employment, medical services and insurance, public security and corruption among local officials. The structural and governance challenges faced by the Chinese Government and CCP as it transitioned through the various reform agenda were immense.
As an example: the role of State-Owned Enterprises was changing from being an instrument of a planned economy to that of one market actor among many, one consequence being that labour was being shed on a massive scale. Urban unemployment was estimated to be at least 30 million, a number I considered to be unrealistically low. Including masses of peasants coming in from the countryside, ‘representatives’ of the floating migrant labour force – 150 million – could be observed walking the streets just beyond the walls of our Embassy. They and the members of the urban underclass, who did not possess the all-important ‘hukou’ residency documents, had very limited access to public services such as health care or – among children and youths – education. One macro-economic effect of this floating population of occasional hires was downward pressure on wage rates. And the future was for an increase in this sub-class of labour, as consolidation and modernization underway in the agricultural sector would send additional waves of laborers to towns and cities that were ill-equipped to serve them.
Another defining feature of transition was corruption. I had recently come across a report, issued by China’s national auditing agency no less, to the effect that illegal spending by government officials reached more than Cdn$30B – about 1.7% of GDP at the time, and 10% of the national budget. It was also officially reported that 4,000 corrupt officials were on the run with $600mm, including an untold number of escapees now abroad. And while Police were on the tail of some of them – Lai Changzing being the prime in-Canada example – others were protected by their Party positions and contacts.
Admittedly, my views on the day’s China could be seen as somewhat hyperbolic. China, I realized at the outset of my third calendar year in Beijing, was dealing with an immense accumulation of cultural and institutional baggage, both pre- and post-1949, which the country new Leaders would need to reject, reform or reinvent. Neither straight line projections of continuing growth or impending disasters would prove correct. What was indisputably essential, in my view, was raising the economic potential and reality of China’s rural and urban poor now displaced by economic reform and opening. Looking two decades into the future, I found it difficult to believe that achieving this could be done without reforming governance as well, including some reliable elements of rule of law, and representative institutions within the CCP. On these latter points, I would be proven wrong.
Forwarded a letter from Minister of International Trade Pierre Pettigrew in support of Thales Avionics involvement in the China Aviation Industry Corporation’s ARJ21 program, addressed to the Minister of Foreign Trade Shi Guangsheng, as well as senior executives of COSTIND and AVIC 1.
Meeting with MFA Vice Minister Li Zhaoxing scheduled, but postponed to next day.
Meeting with Paul Newman of the BC Council of Forest Industries for an update on COFI’s 2X4 housing promotional plans.
I knew Paul well from my own days with COFI, 20 years earlier! I recalled travelling in Japan with him and other COFI colleagues, playing on his name over dinner with izakaya staff, not sure if Paul was the ‘real’ Paul Newman!
Letter to Minister of Natural Resources Herb Dhaliwal underlining the importance of his projected visit to China, yet to be confirmed.
I suggested that the centerpiece of his visit would be attending the ceremony at Qinshan to celebrate the commercial success of the CANDU project. His presence would signal the continuing commitment of AECL to pursue additional projects in China. His visit would draw attention to Natural Resources Canada’s support programs such as the Canadian Wood Initiative, nuclear and non-nuclear energy, geoscience and mining, environmental remediation and S&T cooperation. I suggested as well that he consider a visit to the Three Gorges site near Yichang, in support of Canadian interests related to the second phase of the project. A gathering of the Canada-China Energy Working Group could also be arranged.
Meeting with State Administration of Radio, Film and Television Minister Xu Guangchun.
Regrettably, I have no notes on the meeting’s objectives or discussion, but at a minimum, it would include a discussion of increasing Canadian content in Chinese media.
Exchange of letters with Dr. Shirley Thompson on the Canada Council for the Arts’ increasing interest in engaging with the Chinese arts world and the commitment to attend the March meeting in Ottawa on C/C cooperation in the Arts.
At the moment of responding, Dr. Thompson was no longer the Director. That duty had passed on to John Hobday.
Meeting with MFA FM Li Zhaoxing.
I recall this meeting well. The Lai Changxing case, but especially the rights that Lai had to a full and step-by-step judicial review as he and his lawyer fought extradition to China, was a major irritant for the Chinese, particular the length of time – in their minds – that the judicial process could take. Indeed, I had had a phone conversation with the Vice Minister during my holiday leave in Vietnam, if for no other purpose but to explain yet again the Canadian judicial process, the public nature of the appeals, the priority of protecting the rights of all the accused and the fundamental adherence to Rule of Law and Human Rights. And I pointed to the fact that political interference in the case was not acceptable, legally and morally. Furthermore, it was obvious that tangling the Lai case with the fundamentals of Canada and China’s bilateral relations would not serve any useful purpose. Indeed, it was Canadian law and procedures that had rejected Lai’s applications and appeals to obtain Canadian citizenship in 2002.
The Vice-Minister was a highly intelligent and cosmopolitan individual, and one can safely assume that he fully understood the rationale for the Canadian position. But his job was to defend, and forcefully, the Chinese position, which he did. Lai would exercise his rights – with the able assistance of his lawyer David Matas – until he exhausted his appeals. He would be returned to China in 2011, as explained in Charlotte Bull’s following essay.
Charlotte Bull is a graduate of the University of British Columbia. She provided assistance with research for this memoir, including the Lai extradition case outcome.
In August 1999, a Chinese businessman named Lai Changxing stepped off a plane in Canada, setting in motion a complex legal and diplomatic saga that would span more than a decade. Lai, accused of masterminding a multi-billion-dollar smuggling operation in China, sought asylum in Canada, claiming he would face persecution and possible execution if he returned to his homeland.[1] This case was closely followed by Canadian media a significant test of Canada’s commitment to human rights, its judicial independence, and its diplomatic relations with China.
Lai Changxing arrived in Canada in August 1999 with his wife and children, entering via Hong Kong after being tipped off that Chinese authorities would try to arrest him.[2] Lai filed a claim for asylum, initiating a complex legal process that would involve multiple hearings, appeals, and judicial reviews. He argued that he feared persecution in China – including potential torture or execution – due to the politically charged nature of the smuggling scandal.[3] Canadian media began referring to him as a “smuggling kingpin” or “China’s most wanted man”, highlighting the sensational details of his flight and wealthy lifestyle in Canada (he reportedly bought a Vancouver home for $1 million cash shortly after arriving).[4] [5] [6]
In China, Lai was accused of masterminding the Xiamen Yuanhua smuggling ring. Chinese investigators alleged that throughout the 1990s, Lai’s syndicate illegally imported everything from oil and luxury cars to cigarettes and electronics, all by bribing customs and police officials in Fujian province.[7] This was largely portrayed negatively in the Canadian media but some outlets portrayed it favourable. For example, Globe and Mail reported that the the wide-scale smuggling allowed the company to undercut artificially high prices set by state-owned companies in China, which benefited the economy by reducing prices eg on gasoline.[8] In any case, Canadian news outlets regularly cited the staggering figures associated with the case to convey its magnitude. Early reports noted that Lai’s network may have smuggled “$10 billion worth of goods”, making it the largest smuggling case in the People’s Republic of China’s history.[9] The alleged corruption extended to high levels of China’s establishment: over 300 suspects were prosecuted, 14 people – including officials – were sentenced to death.[10] The list of those implicated ran from local police and customs officers to Communist Party leaders and Vice Mayors, as well as Jia Qinglin who led the province of Fujian during the 1990s. [11] [12] These details, often reported in Canadian media, underscored why Beijing was so eager to have Lai repatriated to face charges.
Lai, for his part, denied being a “smuggling kingpin.” He admitted only to exploiting tax loopholes, not bribery, and insisted that Chinese authorities were scapegoating him for political reasons. In a 2009 interview with The Globe and Mail, which Canadian outlets later highlighted, Lai asserted that if he had not found refuge in Canada, “he would have been executed by now” in China.[13] This claim fed into the central dilemma that defined Lai’s case in Canada: balancing the gravity of his alleged crimes against the risk of severe punishment – even execution – in China’s justice system.
David Matas, a prominent human rights lawyer, became Lai’s lawyer in 2001 and Lai’s bid for asylum was formally heard by Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) in the early 2000s.[14] In June 2002, the IRB’s Convention Refugee Determination Division delivered a decisive rejection of Lai’s refugee claim, determining that he did not meet the criteria for protection under Canadian law. In fact, it concluded his testimony was “not credible” and held “serious reasons for considering [that] Lai had committed crimes of smuggling and bribery”, thus excluding him from refugee protection under Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention.[15] An IRB spokesperson bluntly characterized Lai as “a common criminal and therefore not entitled to refugee protection,” rather than a bona fide refugee fleeing persecution.[16] This position – essentially that Canada should not be a safe haven for someone accused of massive corruption – was echoed in Canadian political discourse and media commentary at the time. The rejection by the IRB meant that Lai was officially marked for removal from Canada, but under Canadian law he was entitled to appeal and exhaust multiple legal avenues before any deportation could occur. Thus began a protracted legal battle through the court system, which Canadian newspapers would later dub a “12-year saga” of delays and appeals.
Lai Changxing’s bid for refugee protection in Canada set off a lengthy legal battle. After the IRB rejected his asylum claim in 2002 (finding Lai not credible and likely complicit in serious crimes), he appealed through every level of Canada’s judiciary.[17] In April 2005, the Federal Court of Appeal in Ottawa dismissed Lai’s appeal, effectively upholding the IRB’s findings – The three-judge panel ruled that the refugee board had acted correctly in deeming Lai ineligible for asylum.[18] However, the court did leave one door open: it allowed Lai to apply for a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) – a process to evaluate the risk of harm if he were deported – This indicated that while the courts agreed Lai was not a legitimate refugee, they were still obliged to consider if deportation might violate humanitarian protections (for example, the risk of torture, which Canada must weigh under the Convention Against Torture).[19]
Lai immediately sought to take his fight to the highest court. In June 2005, he filed an application for the Supreme Court of Canada to hear his case. His lawyer David Matas argued to the Supreme Court that Lai’s case was of national importance, touching on the integrity of Canada’s refugee system and its international human rights commitments.[20] By September 2005, however, the Supreme Court of Canada declined to grant leave to appeal, effectively exhausting Lai’s direct appeals of the refugee decision. The top court’s refusal meant the IRB’s exclusion of Lai as a refugee was final.
Even as Lai’s refugee case was closing, the looming question remained: Could Canada lawfully deport him to China without breaching its own principles? Canada has no death penalty and, by policy, will not extradite or deport individuals to face execution or torture abroad without assurances of their safety.[21] This principle set the stage for the next phase of Lai’s saga, focused on the risk he faced in China and the diplomatic negotiations between Ottawa and Beijing.
Even after losing his refugee claim, Lai remained in Canada by arguing that deporting him would violate the Convention Against Torture. His lawyer, David Matas, noted that Chinese officials had executed numerous people connected to the Xiamen smuggling scandal – at least 17 by some counts – underscoring Lai’s fear that he faced a similar fate.[22] (In fact, Canadian media reported that several of Lai’s alleged accomplices had been given death sentences, and some died in custody under suspicious circumstances.)[23] [24] [25] Early on, China tried to allay these fears. In 2001, President Jiang Zemin had personally sent Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien a diplomatic note assuring that Lai would not be executed if returned.[26] Beijing reiterated such guarantees over the years, hoping to convince Canadian authorities that Lai would be treated humanely. However, it is worth noting that Premier Zhu Rongji said in a television interview in 2001 “if Lai Changxing were executed three times over, it would not be enough.” [27] [28]
In 2006, a pre-removal risk assessment by the Canadian government concluded that Lai would not face undue risk in China, partly due to China’s promises. Matas challenged this finding in court. In April 2007 he won a significant reprieve: Federal Court Justice Yves de Montigny ruled that the risk assessment had been flawed given the widespread existence of torture within China’s criminal justice system.[29] The judge found that the official reviewing Lai’s case failed to determine if the assurances on torture were “meaningful and reliable.”[30] In other words, Canada could not simply take China’s word at face value. Justice de Montigny ordered immigration authorities to conduct a new, thorough risk review, keeping Lai in Canada until it was done. This court decision – essentially demanding proof that China’s diplomatic assurances could be trusted – extended Lai’s stay in Canada by several more years. Lai remained under virtual house arrest in Vancouver during this period, even obtaining a work permit by 2009 as his legal limbo dragged on.[31]
After four years of relative quiet, Lai’s case resurfaced in 2011 when Canadian officials completed a new risk assessment. By this time, China had again provided detailed diplomatic assurances to facilitate Lai’s return. Notably, Chinese authorities pledged that Lai would neither be executed nor tortured, and they made an unprecedented concession: Canadian diplomats would be granted regular access to Lai in custody to monitor his well-being.[32] These promises came against the backdrop of China’s ongoing anti-corruption drive, on the one hand, and on the other, its desire to show goodwill in Canada–China relations. Indeed, Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird, visiting Beijing in July 2011, remarked that both Canadians and Chinese “don’t have a lot of time for white collar fraudsters,” while cautioning that Canada’s legal process must run its course independently.[33]
In July 2011, Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board determined that Lai was not a flight risk and could remain out on bail during final removal arrangements. Hours later, federal lawyers rushed to court and obtained an order to keep him in custody, reflecting the case’s sensitivity.[34] Lai’s legal team filed one last application for a stay of deportation, arguing that China’s guarantees were not trustworthy and that he would not receive a fair trial in the one-party state.[35] “This effort to get at Mr. Lai is a political campaign by the government of China to show it is fighting corruption,” Matas told the Toronto Star, contending that the official assurances “don’t amount to anything” in practice.[36]. On the other side, Canadian federal government lawyer Jan Brongers stated that China had strong incentive to honor its promises. If Beijing reneged and harmed Lai, it would damage China’s international reputation and undermine future efforts to repatriate fugitives.[37] Justice Michel Shore of the Federal Court heard arguments on July 21, 2011. That evening, he delivered the decisive ruling against Lai’s final appeal.
In his judgment, Justice Shore concluded that the extensive diplomatic guarantees provided by China were sufficient. He wrote that “The life of the applicant is in the Chinese government’s hands. The assurances are present. A new contractual government-to-government climate has been created by the assurances.”[38] Shore found no evidence that Lai would face imminent torture or execution, given the formal commitments from Beijing.[39] With this decision, Canada’s courts cleared the last legal obstacle to Lai Changxing’s removal. After an 11-year saga, Lai had run out of options in Canada.
Within days of the Federal Court decision, Canadian authorities moved swiftly. Lai Changxing was taken to Vancouver International Airport and put on a direct flight to Beijing, this in late July.[40] Chinese state television showed Lai, upon arrival, being read his rights by police – a moment of triumph for Beijing that was carried on the evening news.[41]
Canadian diplomats in Beijing closely monitored what came next. China had promised a fair trial for Lai, and Canada intended to hold them to that. Government officials stated that diplomats were granted the agreed-upon access to Lai in detention.[42] In early 2012, Chinese prosecutors formally charged Lai in the port city of Xiamen, Fujian – the epicenter of the smuggling ring he was accused of running.[43]
On May 18, 2012, the Xiamen Intermediate People’s Court announced its verdict. Lai Changxing was convicted on charges of smuggling and bribery and sentenced to life in prison. He also received a 15-year sentence for bribery, and the court ordered the confiscation of all his personal assets. The harsh sentence (short of the death penalty) was widely expected given that Lais guilt had long been stated as fact and was portrayed in this way in Canadian news outlets.[44] According to Chinese court documents, Lai’s smuggling network had evaded an astonishing $3 billion in taxes and fees, and he had bribed 64 officials between 1996 and 1999 to protect the operation.[45] Among those entangled in the case were senior customs officers, police, and provincial politicians, which is why many, including Matas believed Lai was being targeted – to prove that the Chinese government is fighting corruption.[46]
Lai Changxing’s case thus become a touchstone in Canada–China relations. It highlighted Canada’s due process and human-rights safeguards in contrast with China’s judicial system. The protracted negotiations and court battles were reported extensively in the Canadian press, shaping public understanding of the complexities in extraditing fugitives to a country with a very different legal regime. In the end, Lai’s deportation in 2011 removed a long-standing irritant in bilateral relations, while his trial and life imprisonment in 2012 served as a clear signal from Beijing in its campaign against corruption.[47] The legacy of the Lai Changxing affair endures as a case study in navigating the cross-currents of international law, domestic politics, and diplomatic bargaining between Canada and China.
[1] Reuters. (2011, July 22). Canada court rules against China’s most wanted man. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us/canada-court-rules-against-chinas-most-wanted-man-idUSTRE76L06Y/
[2] The Province (2000, Dec 3). Hunt on for fugatives. https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/december-3-2000-page-16-192/docview/2381189377/
[3] Reuters. (2011, July 22). Canada court rules against China’s most wanted man. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us/canada-court-rules-against-chinas-most-wanted-man-idUSTRE76L06Y/
[4] The Globe and Mail (2000, Nov 25) Alleged smuggling kingpin made refugee claim in Canada. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Globe and Mail
[5] The Province (2000, Dec 3). Hunt on for fugatives. https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/december-3-2000-page-16-192/docview/2381189377/
[6] August, O. (2008). Inside the Red Mansion. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
[7] The Globe and Mail (2000, Dec 1). Some Chinese defend kingpin: Smuggler helps Hong Kong, residents say. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Globe and Mail.
[8] The Globe and Mail (2000, Dec 1). Some Chinese defend kingpin: Smuggler helps Hong Kong, residents say. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Globe and Mail.
[9] The Globe and Mail (2001, Mar 15) ‘The whole world knows I will die’: Execution awaits fugitive tycoon. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Globe and Mail pg. A3
[10] Reuters. (2011, July 22). Canada court rules against China’s most wanted man. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us/canada-court-rules-against-chinas-most-wanted-man-idUSTRE76L06Y/
[11] Asian Wall Street Journal (2000, Jan 25) Corruption and Justice in China. https://www.proquest.com/docview/315481808/1058986909054B9APQ/?sourcetype=Newspapers
[12] Reuters. (2007, October 15). Tainted by scandal, China’s Jia faces test. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/tainted-by-scandal-chinas-jia-faces-test-idUSPEK279668/
[13] Reuters. (2011, July 22). Canada court rules against China’s most wanted man. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us/canada-court-rules-against-chinas-most-wanted-man-idUSTRE76L06Y/
[14] Matas, D. (2011, September 6). Canada – Haven or Hideout? The case of Lai Changxing. David-Kilgour.com. http://www.david-kilgour.com/2011/Sep_11_2011_03.php
[15] CBC. (2003, July 15). Accused smuggler fights to stay in Canada. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/accused-smuggler-fights-to-stay-in-canada-1.410180
[16] China Daily. (2025). Fugitive Lai appeals to Canada’s top court. Chinadaily.com.cn. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/14/content_451174.htm
[17] Taipei Times. (2005, March 15). Chinese fugitive appeals Canada’s asylum rejection. Taipeitimes.com; 台北時報. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/03/16/2003246478
[18] China Daily. (2005, April 15). Canada denies sanctuary for Lai Changxing. Chinadaily.com.cn. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/15/content_434637.htm
[19] China Daily. (2005, April 15). Canada denies sanctuary for Lai Changxing. Chinadaily.com.cn. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/15/content_434637.htm
[20] China Daily. (2025). Fugitive Lai appeals to Canada’s top court. Chinadaily.com.cn. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/14/content_451174.htm
[21] Reuters. (2011, July 22). China hails Canada decision to extradite fugitive. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/china-hails-canada-decision-to-extradite-fugitive-idUSTRE76L0FL/
[22] The World. (2016, August 1). China’s most-wanted fugitive loses fight to stay in Canada – The World from PRX. The World from PRX. https://theworld.org/stories/2016/08/01/chinas-most-wanted-fugitive-loses-fight-stay-canada
[23] The Globe and Mail. (2009, Aug 13). JUSTICE LAI CHANGXING (1936-); Aug 13, 2009; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Globe and Mail
[24] The Globe and Mail. (2000, Nov 25). Alleged smuggling kingpin made refugee claim in Canada
The Globe and Mail (1936-); Nov 25, 2000; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Globe and Mail pg. A2
[25] CBC. (2011, July 23). Fugitive Lai arrested in China. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/fugitive-lai-arrested-in-china-1.1117839
[26] Toronto City News. (2012, May 17). China sentences fugitive who sought refuge in Canada to life in prison. CityNews Toronto. https://toronto.citynews.ca/2012/05/17/china-sentences-fugitive-who-sought-refuge-in-canada-to-life-in-prison/
[27] The Globe and Mail. (2012, May 18). Lai’s sentencing marks the end of China’s Great Gatsby. The Globe and Mail. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/lais-sentencing-marks-the-end-of-chinas-great-gatsby/article4186792/
[28] The Wall Street Journal. (2001, Nov 23). In a Land Where Bribes Are Commonplace, A Chinese Millionaire Pushed the Envelope. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1006467009118485760
[29] The Globe and Mail. (2009, Aug 13). JUSTICE LAI CHANGXING (1936-); Aug 13, 2009; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Globe and Mail
[30] China Daily. (2007, April 6). Smuggler Lai wins Canadian court reprieve. Chinadaily.com.cn. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-04/06/content_844726.htm
[31] Toronto Star. (2009, Feb 7). China’s most-wanted man hopes to sell real estate here. https://www.proquest.com/docview/439554493/95A54A963164415CPQ/?sourcetype=Newspapers
[32] Reuters. (2011, July 22). China hails Canada decision to extradite fugitive. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/china-hails-canada-decision-to-extradite-fugitive-idUSTRE76L0FL/
[33] Reuters. (2011, July 18). Canada says Chinese fugitive case has to run its course. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us/canada-says-chinese-fugitive-case-has-to-run-its-course-idUSTRE76H2WH/
[34] City News Ottawa. (2011, July 21). Chinese fugitive’s freedom up in the air. CityNews Ottawa. https://ottawa.citynews.ca/2011/07/21/chinese-fugitives-freedom-up-in-the-air/
[35] City News Vancouver. (2011, July 21). Chinese fugitive Lai Changxing to be deported. CityNews Vancouver. https://vancouver.citynews.ca/2011/07/21/chinese-fugitive-lai-changxing-to-be-deported/
[36] The World. (2016, August 1). China’s most-wanted fugitive loses fight to stay in Canada – The World from PRX. The World from PRX. https://theworld.org/stories/2016/08/01/chinas-most-wanted-fugitive-loses-fight-stay-canada
[37] CBC. (2011, July 21). Chinese fugitive’s deportation upheld. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/chinese-fugitive-s-deportation-upheld-1.1082780
[38] The World. (2016, August 1). China’s most-wanted fugitive loses fight to stay in Canada – The World from PRX. The World from PRX. https://theworld.org/stories/2016/08/01/chinas-most-wanted-fugitive-loses-fight-stay-canada
[39] City News Vancouver. (2011, July 21). Chinese fugitive Lai Changxing to be deported. CityNews Vancouver. https://vancouver.citynews.ca/2011/07/21/chinese-fugitive-lai-changxing-to-be-deported/
[40] Reuters. (2011, July 22). China hails Canada decision to extradite fugitive. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/china-hails-canada-decision-to-extradite-fugitive-idUSTRE76L0FL/
[41] The World. (2016, August 1). China arrests its top fugitive, Lai Changxing, after Canada deports him – The World from PRX. The World from PRX. https://theworld.org/stories/2016/08/01/china-arrests-its-top-fugitive-lai-changxing-after-canada-deports-him
[42] Reuters. (2012, February 8). Canada says has access to China’s most wanted man. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/canada-says-has-access-to-chinas-most-wanted-man-idUSDEE8170EC/
[43] Reuters. (2012, February 13). China formally charges smuggling kingpin Lai. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/china-formally-charges-smuggling-kingpin-lai-idUSDEE81C0D0/
[44]The Globe and Mail (2012, May 19). Lai’s sentencing end of a Chinese scandal:
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Globe and Mail
[45] Toronto City News. (2012, May 18). China sentences fugitive who sought refuge in Canada to life in prison. CityNews Toronto. https://toronto.citynews.ca/2012/05/17/china-sentences-fugitive-who-sought-refuge-in-canada-to-life-in-prison/
[46] The World. (2016, August 1). China’s most-wanted fugitive loses fight to stay in Canada – The World from PRX. The World from PRX. https://theworld.org/stories/2016/08/01/chinas-most-wanted-fugitive-loses-fight-stay-canada
[47] Reuters.(2011, July 22). China hails Canada decision to extradite fugitive. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/china-hails-canada-decision-to-extradite-fugitive-idUSTRE76L0FL/
Meeting with President Jean-Pierre Mortreux and Executives of Thales Avionique Canada and their representative in Beijing, Thierry Defarges. The company, which is still going strong in 2025, was then as now a designer and manufacturer of aircraft flight control systems.
Kumru and I attend the Annual Australian Ball as guests of Ambassador Irvine.
Travel to Shanghai and Nanjing.
This business trip consisted of several elements: chair a Public Diplomacy Strategy meeting, with focus on advocacy and communication initiatives; an evening reception at the newly renovated Canadian Consulate General in Shanghai; a call on Shanghai Vice Mayor Zhang Sixian and media interviews with Shanghai Broadcast Network and Wenhui Daily. Then, on Tuesday the 28th, travel by train to Nanjing for meetings with Chen Jun, VP of Nanjing University and also President Jiang Shusheng of NanDa’s Overseas Education College. I also hosted a dinner for my ‘Nanjing Family’, Shen Bo and his parents, who had so generously hosted me during my Nanjing Daxue Chinese language studies, which had lasted all of a week!
As made clear in our discussions in Shanghai, there was no lack of ideas about the suite of services and initiatives that could be included in a Public Diplomacy Strategy. The discussions centered around two basic questions: the ‘what programs to put in place’, and the ‘sources – human and financial – required to implement’.
Evening Reception to introduce Canada’s renovated Consulate of Canada in Shanghai.
My remarks at the outset of the event were along the following lines:
Meeting with the Vice Mayor of Shanghai Zhang Sixian.
Ambassadors’ meetings such as with VM Jiang serve to advertise Canadian linkages, current and future, with the cities and provinces that are being visited. It’s public relations at the political level. Not that Mayor Jiang needed much in terms of introducing Canada: a graduate of Shanghai Jiaotong University, he had undertaken a six-month fellowship at UBC between ’93 to ’94 during his university studies.
Following the usual and mutual ‘politesses’, I briefed the Vice Mayor on the purposes of my visit to Shanghai, focusing on the planning for expanded public diplomacy by the Embassy and Consulates, in an effort to project Canada’s modern image in a rapidly modernizing China. Not least would be greater attention to the cultural and academic spheres.
With regard to trade and economic interests, I flagged the success of architectural firms, notably Carlos Ott/PPA which had designed a landmark building for the North Bund redevelopment. Also noted: Bombardier’s selection as provider of subway cars for Shanghai Metro’s Pearl Line 1. Bombardier Aerospace had also recently signed an MOU with AVIC 1, to assemble CRJ 700/900 series regional aircraft in Shanghai.
I congratulated the VM for Shanghai’s winning bid for Expo 2010, noting that Canada is willing to share its experience with Expos, and particular expertise in design and construction of exhibition spaces, and the environmental aspects of the event itself.
So, business as usual.
Interviews with the Shanghai Broadcast TV Network, and the Wenhui Daily.
Return flight to Beijing, during the AM.
Afternoon meetings with individual Staff members.
Meeting with AQSIQ Minister Li and VM Wang, who had recently returned from Ottawa, following successful negotiations with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.
The result provides an example of a trade agreement at the ground level: I signed the Bovine Embryo Protocol and handed over the CFIA letter approving 68 casing plants as the final implementation of all the agreements reached in October during Mme Wang’s visit.
Not for the history books perhaps, but much diplomacy is of this nature and level of specificity.
Tête à tête with French Ambassador Jean-Pierre Lafon.
Exchanges with fellow ambassadors can provide advice to address knotty problems with, say, a Chinese Ministry. Opinions are exchanged on how to solve them. However, this call was to discuss the next day’s meeting we would have with AVIC 1 on behalf of the Canadian-French firm Thales, and the joint approach we would take.
Exchange with Associate Vice President (International) of the University of Calgary Dr. W. Duffie VanBalkom, inviting me to be a guest speaker at a gathering of academics with interests in Canada-Asia relations, during a planned visit to Calgary in the spring. To which I agree in principle, dates to be determined.
Exchange with Haleema Mini, Development Coordinator, Playwrights’ Workshop Montreal, where I agree with the nomination of Mr. Gabriel Safdie for the Edmond C. Bovey Award for Leadership Support for the Arts. Among other accomplishments, Safdie had produced Canadian Colleen Wagner’s play, The Monument, in Beijing in November 2000.
Exchange with Managing Director & Regional Executive for International Banking, Bank of Montreal Robert Martin, following the recognition by the China Foreign Exchange Trading Center that BMO Financial Group Guangzhou Branch was the number one Chinese currency trading bank in Guangzhou in 2002.
Shanghai
Guangzhou
Beijing Staff
Air China issue;
EDC
Immigration
Unfortunately, I never visited Tibet, and that, much to my regret. Already in Chongqing and taking the preparatory altitude pills, I was to join Ms. MacDonald in Lassa but SARS intervened: on the eve of my planned departure, there were the first credible reports of a vicious strain of flu which was spreading in Southeast China and HK. The Chinese Government was niggardly with information, to say the least, about what was to become a global epidemic, so we and the rest of the world depended on reports from foreign media and the World Health Organization. While I dearly wanted to join Ms. MacDonald on what promised to be a week of business and adventure, I was also beginning to think about the implications of a serious breakout. From Chongqing, I telephoned ADM David Mulroney for an exchange of views. We agreed that it was best that I return to Beijing. Which I did.
That decision, and the undeniable reality of a constant and heavy ‘business as usual’ schedule resulted in limited time for travel. Thus, I never made it to Tibet or Xinjiang. The farthest West I made it was to Kunming.
At this point, however, it was unclear where SARS was headed.
With French Ambassador Lafon joining, meeting with President Liu Gaozhou of AVIC 1 and Director Tang Xiaoping, National Trade Bureau regarding the interest of Canadian/French firm Thales in commercial sales to AVIC. We reviewed some of the technical issues involved and the qualifications of Thales, as meeting the AVIC needs. We flagged Thales’ qualifications, recognized by the US Federal Aviation Administration, and the company’s international partnerships. All grist for the mill.
Our Chinese counterparts commented on the significance of joint French and Canadian Governments’ support of Thales. Their proposal, having recently been submitted, was under review. Liu and Tang variously commented on the increasing demand in China for regional jets; that China planned to develop the industry with foreign partners, and that Chinese airlines were potential customers. Quality, comfort, product support and price would be determinants, and the buyers would make their own evaluations. Avionics and engine options were up to companies to choose.
Lunch with Nortel’s Representative Robert Mao and staff.
Meeting with Wang Jianqi, General-Manager of Gehua Cultural Development Group, introducing me to the Group’s activities and potential Canadian connections.
Letter from Peter Chung, Vancouver Career College, providing an update on VCC’s North Korea Computer Graphic Design Institute, including the fact that the DPRK Government has requested an addition to the NKCGD’s activities: teaching English to the Government’s senior scientists and engineers in Pyongyang.
I am not aware of any follow-up to this DPRK initiative.
Dinner hosted by Agriculture Deputy Minister Zhang Baowen.
VM Zhang’s responsibilities at the MoA included science, technology and the somewhat mis-named ‘education’ which included issues such as GMOs. He had led the MoA delegation to Canada the previous May for bilateral exchanges. Adding to what was always a pleasant person-to-person style, and the fact that VM Zhang’s daughter had begun her studies at the University of Saskatchewan in 2002.
The talking points for discussion over dinner:
Few issues of international trade are as complicated as that for agricultural products. And few officials were as pleasant to deal with as VM Zhang.
Courtesy call by Iceland Ambassador Eidur Gudnason.
Walk-about among Administration Staff.
Courtesy call by Belgium Ambassador Gast Van Duyse-Adam.
Meeting with Richard Liu, on education marketing.
Thank you letter to Vice Minister Zhang Baowen for hosting dinner and agreeing to Canada’s proposed changes to the fee structure for GMO canola.
Exchange with President Dr. T.P. Chiang Tze of the Vancouver-based Canada China Child Health Foundation which sponsored 81 Child Friendly Centers in China. Funding for the Xian CFC was donated by the Canadian Embassy’s Staff and CIDA. A new center is to open in Qinghai at a date yet to be determine.
Exchange with Brian Wallace, founder of the famed Red Gate Gallery in Beijing, specialized in introducing Chinese artists to the broader world. The Gallery is still going strong in 2025. Red Gate was seeking support from the Visual Arts Section of the Canada Council for the establishment of an International Residencies program at its home base in Beijing. Consistent with the Embassy’s and Consulates’ efforts to promote Canada/China collaboration in the arts, including by young and emerging artists, I provided a ‘to whom it may concern’ letter supporting Red Gate’s initiative.
An exchange with the British Columbia Securities Commission seeking information about a Chinese citizen who is the president of a BC company listed on the TSX Venture Exchange and who is now believed to be in China. We advise the BCSC to contact the RCMP.