Sunday, December 02 – Tuesday, December 04

CCRels

Visit of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Gaëtan Lavertu.

The programs, as reported below, and guest lists reflect the principal issues and contacts important to the management of the Canada/China relationship early in the decade.

Monday, December 03

Meetings:

ChinaMFA

• Canada-China Political Consultation at MFA with Vice Minister Li Zhaoxing.
• Mission Management Committee
• Speech and dinner with Key Chinese and Canadian guests.

Exchange with Ambassador of Finland, Benjamin Bassin, on his presentation of credentials to President Jiang Zemin. Similar exchanges with Argentine Ambassador Juan Carlos Morelli, Turkmenistan Ambassador Gurbanmuhammet Kaxymov, and Cambodian Ambassador Khek Lerang.

A common practice among Ambassador’s flagging the confirmation of official status, following the presentation of Credentials. That said, I don’t recall sending similar letters to my counterparts, nor receiving same from – say – the G7 Ambassadors.

BT&I

Exchange with Special Advisor to the Chairman and CEO, Bank of Montreal, Neil Tate, commenting on his and CEO Tony Comper’s attendance at APEC related meetings in Shanghai in October. He compliments the Embassy and the Shanghai Consulate for their support of the Bank’s activities and aspirations in China, and proposes a luncheon with the CEO on my next visit to Toronto.

Exchange with PMO Special Assistant Jason McLean, who thanks the Embassy for its support during and around the APEC meetings. Exchange with the Potash and Phosphate Institute’s Deputy Director of the China Program Dr. Ronggui Wu about their contribution to the PPI’s Poverty Alleviation Program.

Tuesday, December 04

With Under-Secretary:

CdaGov

Meetings with DFAIT DM Lavertu:

• Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan.
• Vice-Minister Zhang Zhijun, International Department, Communist Party of China.
• Chinese Academy of Science, Institute of Sociology round-table on Social Stability.
• Information session with senior Embassy staff on the Department facing technological changes.
• Review of CIDA program.
• Meeting with civil society members.
• Meeting with gathering of foreign diplomats.

A rich sequence of meetings, notes of which are locked up at Global Affairs Canada and Library and Archives Canada.

Wednesday, December 05

Departure of Deputy Minister.

BT&I

Copy of a letter from Dessau-Soprin EVP International Pierre Hotte addressed to the Sichuan Electric Power Import & Export Corporation re a gas-turbine project in Cuba.

Note to HK CPPCC member Stan Cheung re getting together in Beijing.

Meetings:

• Université d’Ottawa : Doyen Michael Kelly et délégation.
• luncheon gathering for Minister and Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada at the WTO Terry Collins-Williams.

Guest list identifies key contacts on WTO matters, from Government and others, including UBC Professor Pitman Potter.

ChinaDom ChinaGov

Meeting with a small group of Catholic priests residing and practicing their faith and their role as discreet churchmen in Beijing.

The Catholic Church has a long and fractured history in China. The first missionaries arrived in the 13^th century. Among the most famous is the Jesuit priest and scholar Matteo Richi, whose history in China during the 16^th century is among the most interesting stories of foreign engagement in pre-modern China. Post 1949, Catholics were formally divided by the Chinese government authorities between those who were counted by the Catholic Patriotic Association, and those who consider themselves as within the family of Catholics guided by Rome, with priests attending to one or both groups – it was, then and now, complicated. Our Embassy hosted in the Alvin Hamilton conference room, on Sunday mornings, Holy Mass, performed by foreign priests anointed by bishops appointed by the Holy See, these being quiet foreigners who had day jobs during the week, but ministered to the flock on Sundays. The Chinese authorities were aware of this, and did not raise any objectives, as long as the ‘parishioners’ were not Chinese citizens. This required control of entry to the Embassy, by the ‘parish’ itself: mass thus served only members of the foreign community. However unhappy was this situation, it was a fact of life in China. The meeting with the priests therefore dealt with ‘management’ of this arrangement in the Embassy compound.

Thursday, December 06

Education

Fulsome letter from Mount Alison University President and Vice Chancellor Wayne MacKay outlining MAU’s activities with Chinese education partners.

Letter from DM Canadian Heritage Alex Himelfarb congratulating me on my appointment as Ambassador.

ChinaGov

Letter to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Vice Minister Long Yongtu, thanking him for speaking (by video-conference) to the CCBC Annual General Meeting. Attached is the full schedule and program for the call.

Letter to the MFT&EC Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs DG Yi Xiao Jun, informing him that the Minister of International Cooperation/CIDA, Maria Minna, wishes to visit China in early January to review the Canada-China Development Cooperation Program, and visit Chinese counterparts, starting with Minister Shi Guang Sheng. Plans also called for travel to Yunnan to review the Maternal and Child Health program.

CIDA officers in China faced many challenges in pursuing development cooperation in China. But one important positive aspect of the relationship was the fact that Chinese officials had, in most cases, a good idea of CCP and Government policy priorities and program objectives, and thus welcomed high level Government of Canada engagement, which contributed to making planning and implementation activities more manageable and effective. CIDA Officers with experience in other countries, where host country planning and execution were sorely lacking, considered that cooperation with China was much more clearly goal-oriented and productive than elsewhere. And some admitted that it was much more enjoyable. But I leave it to Henri-Paul Normandin to provide his views.

The Canada-China Development Cooperation Program : A Pillar in a Broad-Based Relationship

by Henri-Paul Normandin

Henri-Paul Normandin worked on the CIDA China program several years, including two postings at the Canadian Embassy in Beijing (1987-1992; 1998-2002). He also served as Ambassador to Haiti (2010-2013) and Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations (2006-2010). Prior to this, he held various positions in Global Affairs Canada as well as the Canadian International Development Agency. A specialist in democratic governance, he also pioneered several initiatives in human rights and international development. He holds a Bachelor of Laws degree from McGill University and a Master’s degree in political science from the University of Ottawa. Normandin is currently a Fellow at the Institut d’études internationales de Montréal (UQAM) and a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. He frequently provides commentary on international relations in the media.

When China finally emerged from the Cultural Revolution, in the late ‘70s, it was a poor, isolated country, battered by years of political and economic turmoil. One man managed to take charge and put the country on a totally different path. Deng Xiao Ping launched a reform program, mainly but not exclusively focussed on economic reform. He would proceed strategically, step by step, always careful to claim his policies were firmly grounded in communist ideology, yet introducing elements of capitalism. He also decided to open up China to the world, albeit in a very controlled manner once again, in order to pursue modernization.

The early days

Building on a number of scientific and technical Canada/China exchanges which had started in 1972, that’s when Canada decided to step in. In 1979, the two countries signed an agreement to send 500 Chinese to Canada for training in science and technology. [i]

Discussions ensued as to the possibility of launching a broader-based development cooperation program, under the aegis of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Some were skeptical, not least the Canadian Ambassador to China, Michel Gauvin: ‘’Why are we giving aid to communists?’’, he asked. But Ottawa took a long-term view, under the leadership of Prime Minister Trudeau who had established diplomatic relations with China in 1970, cognizant of the fact that no one could ignore such a big country as China.

Launched in 1981, the program was meant to provide assistance to China in areas of need, but was also conceived as groundwork to establish a more profound relationship between our two peoples. The President of CIDA Marcel Massé, with whom I had the pleasure to work with for several years, wanted to see ‘’the multiplication of contacts at the thinking level’’, with the potential of a ‘’multiplier effect’’ to the benefit of both countries. While the focus was on development, geostrategic and economic considerations were never too far away, even though most commercial initiatives were supported by other Canadian government programs such as EDC.

The funds allocated to the development program would thus not be for infrastructure, but to human resource development in key areas of development for China: agriculture, energy, forestry and management. Furthermore, CIDA would support numerous university linkages – an approach which allowed the establishment of a wide variety of contacts and collaboration in numerous fields and provide depth to relations between Chinese and Canadians.

There was one major exception with respect to infrastructure. China had long considered building the controversial Three Gorges Dam. It solicited Canada to conduct environmental studies, and CIDA obliged. As soon as the studies were released, environmentalists accused Canada of having conducted incomplete studies, out of deference to the Chinese and conflict of interest with Canada’s eyes on potential major contracts down the road. The whole episode became a subject of major debate for years, despite CIDA’s best efforts to take its distance from the undertaking and put it behind.

I jumped in the bandwagon in 1988, when I arrived in Beijing for my first ‘’posting’’ in China. Traveling regularly to the Dongbei (the north east), particularly in Heilongjiang, I witnessed how traditional state farms and state owned forest companies were laboriously trying to improve their management systems and their production, with the assistance of Canadian expertise. I vividly remember my first trip in a steam locomotive to a small company-town, where we were woken up early every morning to the sound of communist propaganda on the town’s speakers, and the smell of coal.

Canada’s presence and support was very much welcomed, and while views would differ once in a while on how to advance together in the implementation of projects, there was a genuine positive relationship between us and our Chinese partners. The young, bright Chinese whom we had sent to Canada to learn English and become interpreters were a stark contrast to the old cadres running the institutions and a sign of change to come.

Not a year had passed following my arrival before a cataclysmic event happened and changed the course of history.

Tian An Men, June 4, 1989

In April 1989, former CCP Secretary General Hu Yaobang passed away. Hu had been purged two years earlier as he was perceived too inclined towards western-style liberalization. As is common in China, students took advantage of the mourning to air grievances and demands. These ranged from economic conditions, corruption and abuse of power, to better governance and political reforms towards democracy. Students occupied Tian An Men Square. The movement grew rapidly, gained public support, and other groups started to join including university professors, intellectuals, workers, and even a number of CCP and government officials – although the movement was disjointed. Demonstrations spread to the entire country.

The CCP was off balance and dithered in its response, from conciliation to threats. It was losing control of the situation day by day. And for once, official state media started reporting directly and openly what was really going on in the streets.

On May 19th, the CCP declared martial law and PLA troops took position in the streets of Beijing. To the CCP’s dismay, soldiers and citizens sympathised. The CCP brought in fresh troops in Beijing which obviously had clearer instructions. Citizens then started to attack troops and set their equipment on fire. After warning the students to leave the Square, the troops moved in with tanks and hundreds, if not thousands, died in the early hours of June 4.

Needless to say, the country – and the world – was in shock.

Along with my wife and 5 month old son, I had gone to Tian An Men Square prior to May 19th, when the ambiance was still euphoric. and witnessed first hand the mood of hope for change. Now, maybe some of those I had met were dead.

The country came to a halt. Ambassador Drake ordered Embassy staff to stay home. That was until tanks took position on the overpass near our diplomatic quarters at Jianguomenwai, with one pointing its canon towards our building. We then retreated to the Embassy, slept there, and evacuated China a few days later.

No one knew what would come next. There was even talk of civil war.

But in a way, nothing more happened.

We flew back to Beijing three weeks later, in a country that was traumatized.

Canada, like other western countries, had to react strongly and condemned what had happened. But not to the point of breaking all the links which had been established over the years and isolating China – which might prove worse both for the Chinese people and for the world.

In so far as the development cooperation program was concerned, existing projects could continue, three projects in the planning stage were canceled, and the planning of new projects was temporarily suspended.

I vividly remember the first official meeting we had with our development cooperation counterparts at MOFERT. Over the years, we had built a strong and productive relationship with the officials, and a level of trust and friendship. As a mid-level officer, I accompanied the Head of our Development Section to the meeting where we informed our Chinese interlocutors of the positions and measures taken by Canada. There was tension in the room, but respect. Our Chinese interlocutors, of course, officially rejected Canada’s perspective on what had happened along with our measures. We did our official, tough diplomatic part. They did theirs. But all of us in the room understood that none of this was ‘’personal’’, the dramatic actions and decisions that led to this situation were made by people well above our pay grade. As we walked out of the room after the official showdown, the leader on the Chinese side and my boss walked side by side, engaging in a quiet conversation, asking themselves : ‘’ok, how are we going to get through this… ’’

A few weeks later, I resumed traveling to project sites to check on the implementation of projects, as well as on the mood. Our local Chinese interlocutors, who had nothing to do with the terrible events, were pleased to welcome us again. A little too much at times, as the Chinese media were keen to use the visit of any foreigner to report that things were back to normal. I had to be clear with my interlocutors that I wanted absolutely no media around my visits and our meetings.

Over the months and years that followed, relations between Canada and China resumed gradually, including the full pursuit of the development cooperation program which was to take on a new direction.

A mature cooperation program

Over time, the development cooperation program evolved towards the policy arena.

As China was looking not only to modernize through technology but also to deepen economic reform and experiment with the market economy, it wanted to benefit from the experience of more developed countries like Canada.

In 1994, we developed a new Country Development Policy Framework, which was reaffirmed in 1999. In accordance with CIDA’s overall objective to promote sustainable development and reduce poverty, the China program revolved around three main objectives :

• To promote China’s continuing economic reform in areas critical to the development of a socialist market economy, and promote economic linkages and partnerships between Canada and China ;
• To promote environmentally sustainable development in China by enhancing its capacity to manage its environment, and
• To increase China’s capacity to improve public management, i.e. governance, democratic development and human rights.

Gender equality was also a cross-cutting theme.

This paved the way for a significant portfolio of projects in a range of fields and regions.

While economic reforms since the late ‘70s had mainly benefited the coastal areas, the Western interior regions lagged behind and poverty levels ran high. China decided to launch a Western Development Strategy. CIDA implemented a series of local development programs (agriculture and local transformation, water supply, schools, health facilities, etc.) mainly in remote arid areas of Gansu but also in neighbouring provinces and autonomous regions such as Ningxia and Qinghai. Those were very ‘’hands-on’’, traditional types of development projects like CIDA did around the world, although here in a different institutional setting.

But at the same time as we were working ‘’in the field’’ and at China’s request, we gradually moved in the area of public policy and public sector reform. Such projects allowed key Chinese policy makers to be exposed directly to a broad range of Canadian ideas and practices in social, trade, economic, financial and other strategic policy areas. Ultimately, these programs aimed to increase public sector capacity to formulate socio-economic policies, to implement them and regulate relevant institutions as a means to improve the socio-economic development process. By way of example, topics included SMEs, fiscal issues, trade policies in the automobile sector, housing mortgages, etc.

All this took place in the context where China was getting ready for its accession to the WTO in 2001.

Several of our projects also assisted the development of China’s key industries, from agriculture (pork and dairy), to transport, aviation, telecommunications and energy, in addition to health and higher education.

As infrastructure and economic production were ramping up rapidly, China realized that this could hardly be sustained without taking care of the environment. That’s why we also engaged in a major project on biodiversity protection and community development in Inner Mongolia.

But the most remarkable initiative was the China Council for International Cooperation and Development, established in 1991. Essentially, China wanted the benefit of top international advice on issues related to environment and development. It turned to Canada to help set up a high-level advisory body, composed half of international ‘’top guns’’ (heads of International Union for Conservation of Nature, the World Wildlife Fund, the World Bank and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, and others) and half Chinese ministers and other Senior Officials. The Council would meet once a year to deliberate and provide advice on various issues, in addition to supporting innovative applied research all year along. The President of CIDA was the International Vice-Chair. This project was truly at the apex of the type of collaboration that could be done between the international community and China, and Canada was the lead on the international side. Some thirty-five years later, the Council still carries on.

Beyond the CIDA program, as of 2000 the CCP itself started to send Party officials for training in Canada under a program coordinated by York University. Topics varied from Western management principles and skills to banking and finance, legal issues and agriculture. This is a testament to the kind of trust that existed between China and Canada, at a time when Party officials had to think beyond classic political doctrine in order to pursue a more modern path for China.

And yes… Governance, Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights !

While there was a broad constituency in Canada in support of the development cooperation program, there was also an expectation that, somehow, we needed to address issues of governance, democracy and human rights – especially after Tian An Men. Furthermore, there was a certain interest, in some Chinese quarters, to better understand these concepts as well as the Rule of Law, and how they may or may not contribute to China’s advancement. China even issued a White Paper on Human Rights in 1991.

Taking advantage of this context, we decided to engage in an exploratory discussion with our Chinese counterparts at MOFERT regarding the possibility of launching pilot projects in these sensitive areas. That was a bold move, but we built on our trusted relations and pursued it with much diplomacy. And it worked.

When we first made the proposition to MOFERT, we crafted it in China’s context, notably its interest for more modern and efficient state institutions to further modernize the country, and of course its interests towards a more open market economy aspiring to join WTO. Our Chinese interlocutors, a little surprised and uneasy, came back to us after consultations higher up and told us: ‘’we are going to have to speak the same language’’. Instead of using what was perceived as western concepts – governance, democracy, human rights, rule of law – they proposed that such cooperation revolve around the concept of gonggong guanli, which roughly translates as public management. Deal !

We were in the mid 1990’s, and Canada was at the forefront in terms of collaboration with China on such issues.

One of our first major projects involved academics, which allowed both governments to keep a healthy distance from discussions of sensitive topics. Beijing University and the University of Ottawa launched the ‘’Canada-China International Human Rights Implementation Project’’, which enabled Chinese scholars and experts to examine how China could proceed with the implementation of the two major international covenants on human rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights.

We moved further into the field of legal reforms and human rights, as we assisted China with the establishment of a National Legal Aid System. And then, simultaneously, in the field of criminal law, starting with an analysis of how the Chinese criminal justice system was consistent, or not, with international norms. Partners in this venture were the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (UBC) and the China University of Political Sciences and Law.  The main concerns were fair trial standards including independence of judiciary, presumption of innocence, right to defense, prevention of torture and abuse, abolition of re-education, reduction of death penalty, etc.

And then a major program implemented by the Université de Montréal, focused on the training of senior judges, through which Chinese judges and legal experts were exposed to concepts such as the independence of the judiciary.

The range of partners involved in such programs thus included the Ministry of Justice and legal aid offices, the judiciary, procuratorates, the China Prison Society, lawyers associations, academic institutions, as well as the National People’s Congress and emerging civil society organizations.

On the latter, we provided direct funding to Civil Society Organizations and NGOs which were beginning to represent citizens on various development and rights issues, from women’s rights to environmental protection.

Meanwhile, on another front, the situation of human rights in China was often the subject of debate and attempted resolutions at the UN Human Rights Commission, where Canada and other Western countries took the country to task. China, of course, was not pleased with this. It often argued that ‘’dialogue and cooperation’’ was a better way to address human rights than political confrontation. Building on this, China and Canada (along with some other western countries) decided in 1997 to replace the annual showdown in Geneva by an official bilateral Human Rights Dialogue. CIDA was again a key player in this. Annual meetings allowed Canadian and Chinese government officials, along with human rights experts, to engage in discussions on a range of sensitive topics. I remember that discussions were often tense and scripted on the Chinese side as their Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which does not really have jurisdiction over human rights issues inside China) would play an outsized role in trying to control the messages. This type of dialogue further expanded, at times, with a Plurilateral Human Rights Symposium involving also countries from Southeast Asia.

But comes a time…

Between the time Canada had launched its early exchange programs in the late ‘70s and the beginning of the new millennium, needless to say that China was a different place. In four decades, China had transformed from a poor, backward, isolated country to a great power. The scope and pace of economic development was nothing less than spectacular. I witnessed first-hand how living conditions of Chinese citizens improved dramatically, although at the expense of equality and the environment. It is often said that never in the history of mankind have we seen in a such a short period of time such a substantial improvement in the living conditions of such a large population.

In these circumstances, carrying on with a development cooperation program funded by Canadian taxpayers had lost its raison d’être.

The program was thus officially terminated in 2013.

Observations

For more than thirty years, the development cooperation programme has been a key feature of the Canada-China relationship.

In terms of development per se, it certainly had an impact. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to dig into project and program evaluations to make the case, but there is ample evidence of impact. At one end of the spectrum, there were traditional projects that had a direct impact on the livelihoods of people, especially in the poor and remote areas of northwest China: their income, food intake, health, education and so on. One type of projects I cherished were those where we would facilitate access to potable water to villages in arid areas, simply by building a pipeline up the hills to bring the water down to the village. Not only did villagers have access to potable water, which reduced diseases, but it freed up young girls from a few hours of gruesome work every day to fetch the water in buckets uphill for their family, and they thus had time to attend school.

Small scale credit projects for women in Xinjiang enabled them to generate income for their families, empowering them along the way as economic and social actors. A simple project to introduce the cultivation of vegetables improved the diet and health of Tibetans in a remote village.

Then a range projects increased efficiency in agricultural production (dairy, pork) which not only allowed to put better and cheaper products on the market but also reduced pressure on resources – including the deterioration of grasslands.

Modern technology and management techniques were introduced in a range of industries, form intermodal transportation to energy.

Moving up the scale at the policy level, new ideas and policies were introduced to support the development of a more market-oriented economy. By way of a simple, yet telling example, I remember asking a young Chinese official after a study tour in Canada to look at SMEs what he had learned; he replied ‘’the concept of an enabling environment for enterprises’’.

And last but not least, we introduced new ideas on environmental management.

There were a few things remarkable to this development cooperation program, as compared to programs in several other developing countries.

First, the Chinese were always in the driver’s seat. They knew what they needed and wanted. Second, they had an ‘’absorptive capacity’’, i.e. more often than not they were able to fully benefit and capitalize on the support they were getting and on the constructive engagement with Canadians, not only in the immediate but in order to build by themselves for the future. Last but not least, similar to what happened in South East Asia, they provided, through the development of their institutions, policies and reforms, a favourable environment so that development could take off.

In short, they managed to get the best they could from cooperation as they took development into their own hands.

Not that it was a smooth ride, far from it. But looking at the big picture, China was successful at its own development. And Canada was part of it, if only in a modest way.

Beyond the development impact, the development cooperation program was an asset in Canada’s overall relationship with China. It certainly enabled Canadians from many walks of life (business people, students and academics, scientists, government officials, civil society, etc.) to gain a better understanding of China and develop mutually beneficial relationships. To cite but two examples, programs which supported university linkages enabled hundreds of academic and scientific research projects. And a program which introduced potash and better fertilization techniques to increase agricultural production allowed the Canadian potash industry to increase its sales in China, for the benefit of both countries.

As Ambassador Joseph Caron summed it up in 2001: ‘’In fact, from its inception in the early 1980’s, in addition to having an impact on China’s development, the cooperation program initiated many of the contacts that now exist between Canadian and Chinese people and organizations and thus contributed to the breadth and depth of our relationship’’.[ii]

The program was also much appreciated by Canadian politicians, as it often allowed for good announcements to improve ties between the two countries, and visits by the Ambassador in various parts of the country. But the best example might be Prime Minister Chrétien’s visit to an impoverished village in Gansu in 1998, where we implemented a project to improve water supply. I had to do a lot of convincing to add this half-day to his official visit, bearing in mind the risky logistics and unusual protocol, but it turned out to be a total success. The PM was genuinely moved by his interaction with the villagers, and it made for great communication as the Globe and Mail titled: ‘’PM commutes with poorest of the poor’’.

The program also enabled Canada to address human rights and political issues, and even make some progress on this front, through collaboration, and not only confrontation. When PM Chrétien came back to China with the largest Team Canada ever, in February 2001, together with Ambassador Balloch we dared to build on our engagement to set the stage for an address on the ‘’rule of law’’. I drafted the very first version of the speech, and to my pleasant surprise most of it made it into the final version! The PM shared our perspective on the true meaning of rule of law, and while acknowledging China had made some headway, he encouraged additional reforms consistent with international standards.

More broadly, the program did contribute to warm relations and friendship between the people of both countries. And even after the program ended, many Canadians and Chinese continued to dialogue and work together on various issues.

In retrospect

The next question one may ask is: over time, did all of this run counter to our interests? We were hoping China would grow, modernize and not only reduce poverty at home but also become a responsible world economic actor and that the Canadian economy would also benefit from it. But many now focus on the fact that China did not really play by world trade rules and now engages in economic (and other) practices that are harmful to the rest of the world, including Canada.

I would opine that what Canada and other western countries did at the time was the right thing to do. What would have been the alternative? To oversimplify, let China poor, isolated and unstable? And as China took off, it consumed Canadian goods and resources and produced goods which we bought, there is no doubt it did benefit Canada and the world economy. Now, while much of this still holds, we face new challenges in terms of our relationship with China. To each epoch its challenges and opportunities.

On the political front, there was sort of an underlying assumption that as Canada and the rest of the world engaged with China, and as China would reform towards a more market-oriented economy, it would also liberalize along the way towards a less authoritarian society.

Were we naive?

Not quite. I can quote my own thesis, published in 1996, where I asked if the reforms implemented between 1978 and 1995 had an impact in terms of the prospects for democracy in China. My conclusion was that the reforms had a modestly positive impact on this front, but that on the whole the probability for democracy to emerge was very low.[iii]

Through our development cooperation programs, we did introduce Chinese academics, experts and officials to concepts and the practice of human rights, rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, citizen’s participation, transparency in the public policy making process, and so on. Some of these projects did result in change. For instance, a legal aid system was introduced; changes were made to criminal law to improve due process; a community correction system was introduced as an alternative to sentencing; labor re-education system was abolished; emerging NGOs got engaged in social and political issues (environment, women’s rights, etc.). Most importantly, these changes were brought about by Chinese themselves, working in various organizations.

Looking at the broader picture, between 1980 and 2010, the state did loosen its control over citizens and society and tolerated some degree of public debate.

But if there were such modest advancements, needless to say, the fundamentals of the political structure did not change. The CCP managed to maintain itself at the helm of the country, convinced that it, and only it, is the legitimate entity to exercise power and lead the country, The CCP could have decided to continue to open up to some extent the political system, but in the last decade, essentially since Xi Jin Ping became leader, China has made a turn in the opposite direction. Today, the CCP’s control over society is as strong as ever, and one might say China is moving from a strong authoritarian regime to a totalitarian regime.

Yet, should the winds of reform blow again, a generation of reform-minded citizens and leaders will be able to build on some of the work accomplished in the last few decades.

Epilogue

It has been twelve years since the development cooperation program came to an end. It seems like a century. All of that seems forgotten, overtaken by new dynamics.

There was a time where Chinese and Canadians were celebrating their friendship and successes. Not any more, at least at the official level. But the people of China and Canada that were involved in the development cooperation program, and those who are aware of our history, still cherish the personal and professional relationships.

The Chinese government now treats Canada with the arrogance of a major power. It seems to have completely forgotten its lao pengyou – old friends – and the road we traveled together. No more banquets and toasts with the familiar Wei Jia-Zhong Youyi, Ganbei !

If disappointing, no point in being nostalgic. It’s the reality of the harsh world we live in.

Our relationship with China will never be what it used to be. But hopefully we can develop a new, different, productive relationship for the benefit of both countries – and the world.

And may the spirit and bonds that emerged through more than thirty years of development cooperation serve as an inspiration.

[i] For a historical overview of the development cooperation program, see Chapter 4 in Frolic, B. Michael, Canada and China : A Fifty-Year Journey, University of Toronto Press, 2022.

[ii] Developing Together for a For a Bright Future : Canada-China Development Cooperation, Canada-China Cooperation Support Unit, 2001.

[iii] For a summary, see : Normandin. Henri-Paul, Quinze ans de réforme en Chine : Impact sur les perspectives d’émergence de la démocratie, Revue canadienne d’études du développement, numéro spécial, 1996.

I am indebted to Prof. Bernie Frolic of York University as well as Professor Vincent Yang, former Director of the China Program at the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, for their review of my paper as well as their suggestions and input. Of course, I remain solely responsible for the final product.

June 2025

Meetings:

• Wen Yezhan, former PRC Ambassador to Canada.
• Singapore-based Steven McGurk, International Development Research Council International Center.
• Arthur Anderson&Co Beijing representative Bryan Henderson.

Friday, December 07

Letter to Dr. Larry Wynant, Associate Dean, Richard Ivey School in HK.

Letters to individuals met at Pacific Economic Cooperation Council conference in HK.

Meetings:

DPRK

• Tongsun Park, Korean-American businessman.
  
  One of those ‘ya dance with the guy that brung ya’ contacts when dealing with the DPRK. That Park had significant connections with the North Koreans, given his background, was hardly surprising. Whether to believe everything he told you was another matter. So, you asked questions, and subsequently sifted through his answers. Comes with the territory. And useful when you head for Pyongyang, as I did the next day.
  
  Park’s biography on various websites are worth the read.

ChinaGov HR&RoL

• People’s Supreme Court President Xiao Yang.
  
  Would that I had notes of this meeting. President Xiao, a former Minister of Justice, was counted among the major legal reformers of the era, leaving his mark on the legal scope of capital punishment and the professionalization of judges. He promoted the principle of judicial independence but lost that fight…up there with Huang Hua and other reformers. 

• Meeting with Asia Development Bank Representative André Russell.

Arts&Culture

Attended performance of Ballet Jazz de Montréal.

Saturday, December 08 – Tuesday, December 11

Travel to Pyongyang for presentation of credentials and first set of meetings with DPRK Officials. Full program in 2001 Binder.

Monday, December 10

Presentation of credentials to ‘Comrade’ Kim Yong Nam. President of the Presidium of Supreme People’s Assembly’.

My Wife, Kumru, and Embassy political staffer – and ur-DPRK-hand – Sven Jurchevsky also attended the meeting with President Kim. While rigid in his presentation, he displayed the intelligence and sophistication for which he was known, hardly surprising given his experiences as Minister of Foreign Affairs for 15 years, following an even longer period of engagement in both Party and the Foreign Ministry. A case in point: the meeting took place in the Supreme Peoples’ Assembly Building, which was not heated, this in mid-December. The room where we met was freezing, and we had left our overcoats in an adjoining room. Kim could sense our growing discomfort as the meeting stretched beyond the allotted 30 minutes. He admitted to the cold, and blamed United States sanctions!

My initial remarks were the typical cross-cultural blather about uniting peoples as a result of having formally established diplomatic relations. (This was not the venue for accusing the North Korean Government of thrashing the basic rights of its citizens.) After which I focused rather on the generosity of Canadians through the World Food Program, of 100,000 metric tons of wheat, between 1999 and 2001, to help mitigate what the DPRK called ‘the arduous march’ of mass starvation, due to Mother Nature less than to the North Korean government’s mismanagement of the agricultural sector, of which they could never admit. Canadians contributed some $25 million to the effort, placing it among the larger donations. This emergency relief, which was overseen by the WFP’s representatives on the ground, was destined to children, pregnant women and the elderly, the most vulnerable of North Koreans.

The next day, my Wife and Sven accompanied me to meet the Representative of the WFP in North Korea, the remarkable (and American) Richard Ragan, and members of his staff, and to travel north in the WFP’s Toyota Land Cruisers (sans-machine guns) for the drive east of Pyongyang and up the coast towards Russia, this to visit a distribution center for Canadian wheat. And indeed, the center, including DPRK staff, were at work, using Canada branded bags for onward distribution. Fine. However, while the center could be seen from the highway in the distance, it was mostly hidden by huge posters of Kim Jong-il, boasting of his care and love for his People! (As I write this, Richard is Representative and Country Director for the WFP in Ukraine. A truly remarkable individual.)

Later in the day, we visited a hospital where worked a small number of equally remarkable Canadian doctors, part of an international contingent of aid workers doing what they could to help the North Korean people in their distress.

Tuesday, December 11

ChinaDom

China formally joins the WTO.

ChinaGov

Letter to  MoFTEC Vice-Minister Long Yongtu thanking him for his video call speech to the CCBC Annual Meeting and congratulating him for his notable contribution to the WTO membership process over the last decade.

Wednesday, December 12

Return to Beijing.

Lettre de Jean René, Direction Asie-Pacifique, Ministère des Relations internationales, Province de Québec.

Meetings:

Media

Interviews, all DPRK related

• Eric Meyeur, Radio-Canada.
• Paul Mooney, MacLeans;
• journalist from the Foreign Economic Herald;
• Martin Cohn, Toronto Star;
• Davies, Ward, Philips&Vineberg law office;
• RoK Ambassador re DPRK;

Thursday, November 13

Exchange with Father Francis Xavier Zhang Tian Lu, Bishop’s Diplomatic Secretary, Beijing Diocese Catholic Church

Exchange with Professor Pitman Potter, UBC re an internship candidate for work at the Canadian Embassy.

Meetings:

• ChinaGov Ministry of Construction Vice Minister Liu Zhifeng;
• Maxwell Brotman, Fuller-Landau:
• FAO Representative Dr. Gamal Mohamed Ahmed;
• Ambassador Fereydoun Verdinejad, Iran; – Patrick Chua, Sunwing Energy.

Friday, December 14

ChinaGov

Letter of thanks to Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan for his meeting with DFAIT Deputy Minister Lavertu.

Meetings with:

• Newfield Seeds;
• Angelo Zia, China-Alberta Petroleum Council;
• Bob Adachi, Senior VP, SNC Lavalin.

Sunday, December 16

Dinner for new ambassadors hosted by Minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. The Foreign Minister had served a number of times in the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo.

In all probability, because we were both ‘Japan Hands’, I found myself sitting next to the Foreign Minister. Much of the conversations with the Ambassadors was via English translation, but FM Tang and I occasionally chatted in Japanese, much to the irritation of my fellow Heads of Mission. I remember the evening as being quite fun. Conversations were social rather than official.

Monday, December 17

Letter of thanks from General Manager/China, Chris Slade, Canada Livestock Services.

Meeting:

• Ambassador Eleih Etian, Cameroon, and Dean of the Diplomatic Corp.
  
  Not an aspersion against Ambassador Etian but in many cases, all that is required for becoming the Dean is to be forgotten by your home Foreign Ministry long enough to outlast all other resident ambassadors.
  
• Executive Director of Central Mortgage and Housing Canada and delegation.

Tuesday, December 18

Meeting:

• Dr. Wan Ming, Director of the School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University.

Wednesday, December 19

CdaGov

Letter to Minister of Natural Resources Ralph Goodale, with a copy of a fulsome report of PM Chrétien’s October 22 visit to the Qingshan site following the APEC Leaders’ Meeting. The report includes comments by Liu Jibin, the Minister-level Chairman of COSTIND, (Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence) that ‘he would consider advancing the schedule for purchase of subsequent reactors’ to which he added a glowing report to the PM on the progress of the Qinshan CANDU project’.

I had called on Liu Jibin on October 11, so was not entirely surprised by his welcoming remarks.

BT&I AECL

Qinshan was perhaps the clearest, large-scale real-world result of the decades of Canadian involvement with China since the era of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. That China would trust the expansion of its nascent nuclear energy grid to a foreign country’s technology and engineering skills – with 150 Canadians and their families, among a total of the approximately 500 staff engaged at site – provides an indicator of one possible overall direction of China’s integration in the world’s economy, for its growth and policy direction. The other justification for believing that the Chinese Communist Party was heading in a somewhat more internationalist if not liberal direction was, of course, joining the WTO, with its two-way set of mutual obligations in the international trading system. This era lasted until the Party changed direction more clearly at the end of the Hu Jintao administration. No additional CANDU reactors were built, despite the comment during the visit by no less than the Chairman of the important Commission for Science Technology and Industry for National Defence ‘that he would consider advancing the schedule for purchase of subsequent reactors’.

Meetings:

• John Cheh, Bombardier representative;
• President Lu Zhongwei, China Institute for Contemporary International Relations.

Thursday, December 20

ChinaGov

Letter to Vice-Minister Liu Zhi Feng, Ministry of Construction, re a recent luncheon session including representatives of CMHC.

Letter from the Globe&Mail correspondent Miro Cernetig, introducing himself.

Friday, December 21

Education

Letter from University of Calgary President and Vice-Chancellor Harvey Weingarten re future visit to promote UCal’s China linkages.

Letter from Rector and Vice-Chancellor Frederick Lowy, Concordia University responding to my recent letter to him, re student recruitment.

Lettre à Richard Bertrand, Président, Bureau des Gouverneurs, Université d’Ottawa, donnant suite à la proposition d’offrir un programme d’MBA à Petro-China et China National Oil Corporation.

ChinaGov BT&I

Letter to Director-General Wang Wei, Customs Tariff Commission of State Council, Ministry of Finance, regarding the decision to reduce the tariff faced by Canadian feed peas exporters.

Meetings: 

• Zhang Yunling, Asia Pacific Institute; China Institute of International Studies;
• Willy Lam, CNN HK;

Saturday, December 22

Letter to President and CEO Robert Brown, Bombardier, in response to his letter of thanks for Embassy support, and comments on issues before Bombardier in China, including a parts manufacturing joint venture.

Monday, December 24

Letter to a Chinese doctoral candidate regarding employment at the Canadian Embassy.

Wednesday, December 26

Letter to President Huang Yan, PetroChina, promoting links with the CNPC-Alberta Petroleum Center and the University of Ottawa’s MBA program.

Sunday, December 30

Reception hosted by FM Tang Jiaxuan to celebrate the New Year.

Monday, December 31

Letter to President Rod Fraser, University of Alberta regarding UofA’s ambitions in China.

Letter to Globe Foundation of Canada President and CEO John Wiebe, on the forthcoming Globe 2002 conference, scheduled for March ’22.