Wednesday, August 18

Arrival in Beijing, a Saturday, with my dear Wife, Kumru, and daughter Yasemin, who would begin her studies at Havergal College in Toronto in the fall. We were met at the Beijing Capital Airport by Embassy Senior Staff, which is in the Foreign Service tradition. Our driver during four years in Beijing is Laoji. He brings us promptly to the Embassy compound and the ‘Official Residence’, better known as the OR, under the efficient oversight of Xiao Hu, the Butler and house manager. As is usually the case, new Ambassadors inherit the OR Staff of their predecessors, which assures a smooth transition. Staff changes can occur over the course of the posting – including the-all important OR Chef. More on that later.

Thursday, August 19

We explore the neighbourhood.

The Canadian Embassy is located about 5 kilometers northeast of Tiananmen Square, 15, 20 minutes by car. Nearby are several embassies, with the Australians immediately next door, Germany across the street, the RoK and Japanese a bit north. Pleasantly, the Liangma River – in fact, barely a creek – flows with great modesty just north of our compound. In the neighbourhood is the Sanlitun district which, at the time of our posting, was the most westernized entertainment and shopping district in Beijing.

When I arrived, the Embassy staff complement included 65 Canada-based staff/CBS  and 210 Locally Engaged Staff/LES including those hired through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Diplomatic Services Bureau. Also among the LES are members of the broad expatriate community living in Beijing. The Embassy held representational responsibilities for 11 federal and provincial government departments and agencies. The Embassy budget was over C$11 million. This made it among Canada’s largest establishments, surpassed at the time – I am guessing – by Washington, London, Paris, Tokyo and Delhi.

My initial priority was meeting the senior Program Managers. Staffing changes were in full swing during the summer season, and thus, a number of us would be at the lower end of the learning curve. Until my Head-of-Mission assignment, I did have the not-insignificant advantage of serving as Assistant Deputy Mission for Asia as well, for 3 years, as APEC Senior Official. I kept that post till the end of 2001, given that – coincidentally – it was the China Year. The Leaders’ Meeting would take place in Shanghai this forthcoming October, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to attend, with a Team Canada coterie of Canadian businesspeople coming along for non-APEC promotional activities.

In addition, during my final year as ADM, my DFAIT colleagues and I had updated and sharpened the Government’s China Strategy. I thus had fresh and clear sense of the key objectives which I and my senior colleagues would seek to achieve. These were the current iterations of the four basic ‘Pillars’ – actually, sectoral priorities – that framed the day-to-day activities of the Embassy and the Consulates – Shanghai, Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Chongqing. These pillars were: economic partnership, sustainable development, human rights, and security. First articulated by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien during the Team Canada visit to China in 1994 – the first of three such visits – they were conceptually broad enough to allow an impressive range of activities, and did not constrain the Embassy or DFAIT – the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade – from adopting objectives, strategies and tactics that advanced the overall policy agenda.

That said, I had much to learn on how to deliver these objectives on the ground, in Beijing, and in many of China’s major urban centres. Blessedly, I was accompanied on my journey by a highly skilled team of senior and junior staff, many ‘China Hands’ in the fullest sense of the term: knowledgeable through years of study on the ground in China, with attendant language and reading skills.   

Also important at the outset was becoming familiar with the management structure of the Embassy, built around a small set of committees that made many of the management decisions. I had a lot to learn, and fast.

The Embassy held weekly Mission Agenda Meetings – MAM – which I chaired. It was attended not only by Senior Managers but also mid-level staff – on average, a total of 18 officers which were joined over the phone by the Consuls General of Shanghai, Chongqing, Guangzhou and Hong Kong, all of this to insure that the Embassy and Consulates shared a common understanding of what was going on, notably upcoming Canadian visitors who required special attention, e.g. Ministers and their Deputies, both federal and provincial, top level corporate executives, university presidents and so forth. A Housing Committee chaired by a senior Staffer oversaw the assigning of housing ‘on and off campus’ and worked to assure that staff living conditions did not in themselves become issues affecting family life and job performance. It was important, for example, for families with children to be situated close to international schools. A Contract Review Committee played an essential role, ensuring that all embassy and program contracts were consistent with Canadian law and practice, and that they also met the requirements of Chinese law. Contracts were not limited to providing Embassy services: Government of Canada programs, notably CIDA, funded projects with a wide variety of ODA partners who had their own contracting rules. Other functions required their own committees: Security and Contingency Planning, Technology Acquisition and Management, Staff Relations, Events and Logistics, Occupational Health, Safety and Environment, Security and Contingency Planning, each set of issues addressed by the committees requiring management overview. Not the most fun part of working in the Foreign Service, but essential to the delivery of all Government of Canada objectives and programs, and that in an atmosphere of transparency and collaboration.

Tuesday, August 21

Embassy walk-about. During these early days, better to meet Staff where they work than in my office. The walk-abouts were interspersed with issue specific briefing sessions, for example, the preps for my Presentation of Credentials to President Jiang Zemin at the Great Hall of the People on September 6; the roles and membership of the various Embassy committees and decision making processes; the management of the Official Residence Staff; and issues briefings such as the Lai Changxing case, which deserves its own Topic for the search function: LCX. Indeed, in the course of early discussions with the Embassy senior staff, it was evident that the Lai Changxing issue would belabor the Canada/China relationship at both the Chinese Communist Party and Government levels.

PM Chrétien would have to be prepared to address this issue when he would meet President Jiang Zemin in a bilateral meeting during the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Shanghai in October. While ADM, I had negotiated with PRC Ambassador Mei Ping the details of the commitment by China that Lai would not be executed if/when he was extradited to China. It would be just under ten years before it was resolved, when Lai had exhausted his legal maneuvers in Canada against extradition and, once in China, was sentenced to spend the rest of his days as a guest of China’s penal services.

ChinaMFA

First meeting as Ambassador-designate with Assistant Minister Zhou Wenzhong. Getting to know you exercise. ‘Welcome to China’ and ‘Committed to work with you on expanding the Canada-China relationship’ and so forth. Zhou was impressive and suited to the job as China/Canada interlocutor. He would eventually become PRC Ambassador to the US.

Tuesday, August 21 – Saturday, August 25

Travel to Dalian for the APEC Senior Officials Meeting.

APEC

I remained, until the upcoming APEC Shanghai Leaders’ Meeting, Canada’s Senior Official for APEC, and thus attended the meetings in Shenyang. Representing all of the APEC Senior Officials, I made the thank you remarks to Acting Governor Bo Xilai (full Governor in 2003) for hosting a dinner for us, and did so in (fractured) Chinese, with the interpreter providing the English version. This of course humored just about everyone in attendance, especially the interpreter.

ChinaPs&Ms

Following the Senior Officials’ Meeting, I also had a private meeting on the 23rd with Bo. We discussed specific Canadian business interests and complexities of business and government collaboration at a time when Western rules and norms were still in the making in China, with WTO membership in less than 3 months. Bo spoke of his strong support for working with Canada, it’s companies and government officials. He went so far as to state that he would be seeking my advice on issues.

Bo Xilai, of course, would advance both in the CCP and in government, becoming Minister of Trade and subsequently Mayor of Chongqing, with all that followed: accusations of corruption, bribery, abuse of power but most importantly, even if not on the charge sheet, perceived threat to CCP Central Committee leadership. (For good measure, his Wife, Gu Kailai was convicted of implications in the murder of a British businessman.) Bo was expelled from the CCP and the courts gave him a life sentence. I knew him best as Minister of Trade, which provided a number of opportunities for discussions, both formally and informally – once, at a wedding. Obviously, this ease of contact was thanks to the fact that he is completely conversant in English. There are hundreds of Internet sites covering aspects of Bo Xilai melodramatic career, including on the political environment which shaped his success and dramatic downfall.

Thursday, August 23

ChinaPs&Ms

Meeting: Dalian Mayor Li Yangjin.

My meeting with the mayor addressed a set of practical issues regarding established and future cooperation with Canadian companies involved in his city in education, port and airport infrastructure, as well as tie-ups with the China Aviation Industry Corporation (AVIC1).

Friday, August 24

Ottawa informs us of the forthcoming visit to Beijing of a Deputy Minister Gaëtan Lavertu-led Canadian delegation for the next round of the Canada/China Political Consultations, to begin Dec 3.

Sunday, August 26

Return to Beijing.

Attended the concert performance Canadian violinist Lara St-John.

Monday, August 27

MAM

My first Mission Agenda Meeting.

This was my first of these weekly meetings, assembling the Program Managers and, depending on the agenda, individual staff members. The agendas were comprehensive, a combination of ‘what’s happening this coming week and, in the mid-term’, and ‘how we are organized to respond’. There was always a plethora of Mission management issues to discuss. These would include: organization and governance; staffing issues such as Performance Management standards; budgets, resources and facilities; the overall working environment, inside as well as immediately outside the Embassy, as Chinese police kept a watchful eye on the comings and goings of staff and, especially, Chinese people, including Chinese Canadians.

One central theme was the management of incoming visits – or perhaps more descriptively put – the management of the Niagara of visits – federal and provincial: Ministers, Deputy Ministers, delegations of issues experts from Canadian Government departments; Canadian business leaders, at the most senior corporate levels; artists, journalists, academics on individual research projects; university Presidents seeking to expand the number of Chinese students in their cohorts.

The various and multitudinous objectives of these visits by Canadians and their businesses and their institutions from sea to shining sea were reflective of Canadian public and private sector responses to Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’, the CCP’s theoretical driver of ‘reform and opening’. Simply put, the objective was the dual task of reforming the economic system and engaging with the world outside China. Reform did not apply to the fundamentals of the political system. Nevertheless, the forthcoming Chinese entry to the WTO provided immense energy and direction to China’s outward expansion. This strategy received a reciprocal response from the international community – governments, academic institutions, businesses, cultural groups and individuals and so forth, coming through a heretofore semi-closed door that was opening more and more widely. I should add that the number of high-level visitors was so great, for purposes of efficiency and professionalism, we established a small Visits Unit – I think that’s what we called it – just to handle the flow with a degree of regularity and professionalism. Speaking personally and ‘en passant’, I cannot imagine a more exciting and promising period in Canada/China relations. It was thrilling to be there.

MAM’s big-picture meetings, which I chaired, would be supplemented in the months and years to come, by issues-specific meetings with individual Program Managers responsible for the principal Embassy programs:  Political, Trade&Economic, Immigration, Consular, Security, Administration, CIDA, Canadian Forces, and so forth, especially significant during the first few months of my posting. These deep dives educated me on the details of issues and events that were the central tasks of each Embassy Section and helped define much of my role in advancing Canadian interests and managing the Embassy. To that end, I also invited Senior Managers and individual staff members on occasion for informal lunches, or dinners with Spouses, to humanize relationships and provide opportunities for ‘off the record’ discussions. Now that Readers are familiarized with the centrality of the MAM function, it is a good place to introduce the Embassy Sections that ran its programs.

  1. The Ambassador’s Office

    Then as now, my concept of the job of the Ambassador – also titled the Head of Mission – can be summarized in three sets of obligations. Firstly, possessing a clear understanding of the Government of Canada’s foreign policies and objectives vis-à-vis the country of assignment; secondly, working with Embassy Colleagues to develop strategies and programs to achieve those objectives; and thirdly, achieving a credible level of expertise on the host country: its politics, its leadership, its national objectives, and not only those of the central government. Like all over-simplifications, the three points above provide little light on what the Embassy and Staff actually do on a daily basis.

    The real work is in the development and implementation of the strategies to achieve Canada’s objectives at the ground level in China, with input and collaboration with Foreign Affairs and other Departments in Ottawa, ensuring that the human and financial resources are in place, and then proceeding with the diplomatic part: connecting the Canadian interests with the Chinese individuals and institutions that can deliver on those interests.

    My Office was staffed by a CBS Personal Assistant, an LES Local Assistant and an Executive Assistant – in many ways, a Chief of Staff, one of whom – Jennifer May – is, as I write, Ambassador to China herself! To say that they helped me keep the ship afloat barely describes to what extent I depended on their professionalism, dedication and commitment to the long hours that their jobs entailed.

    When I arrived, the Staff Complement in Beijing consisted of 65 Canada-based Staff/CBS and 210 Locally Engaged Staff/LES. (These numbers however would vary over time.)

    In addition to my office, the functional elements of the Embassy were the following.

  2. Political, Economic and Public Affairs Section/PERPA

    Lead by a Minister level Foreign Service Officer (FSO), it consisted of a staff of 15 CBS and LES, including interpreters, research assistants and project officers.

    Popular culture tends to describe the work of the political officers of an Embassy as focused on a combination of skulduggery, spying, high end life-styles and out-thinking the host country in the pursuit of national interests, most often either vaguely defined but with potential life and death outcomes if the diplomats foul things up. Most if not all of the action takes place in the Political Sections of the imaginary embassies. That’s not, of course, the way it works…except for the fact that the Section is indeed very much at the center of the action.

    Political Sections in Canadian Embassies generally have responsibility for interacting with the host country on matters political and economic, as well as public affairs, that is,  the promotion of Canada’s image in the host country. This was very much the case in Beijing. Put in simple terms, the Section ensured that Canadian positions on bilateral relations and international political and economic developments – as articulated in DFAIT and other Departmental Strategic Objectives that evolved over time – were advanced through active advocacy aimed at China’s leadership and government officials. Given China’s increased political, economic and geopolitical influence, the Section sought to ensure that Canadian positions were put to the Chinese Government in a manner calculated to maximize their relevance to China as well as Canada and thus obtain Chinese support or, at a minimum, understanding. This advocacy was almost a daily activity of face-to-face meetings with Chinese Officials. Of equal importance was ensuring that the talking points of visiting Government officials, including political figures, both national and provincial, were in close harmony with these agreed objectives.

    Government to Government messaging however is never enough. Then as now, public diplomacy – systematic engagement beyond Government, with the Chinese media, opinion leaders, academia, intellectuals, business organizations and others, was also a central part of the job.

    The other side of advocacy – reporting on political and economic developments in China – was also among the most important tasks of the Section. DFAIT provided the Political Officers. Finance Canada staffed the Embassies of the G7 and other important economies with one of their own. I considered political and economic reporting to be my responsibility as well, benefiting from the access that my rank as Ambassador provided in China, and the responsibility of communicating my views directly to the PM, federal Ministers and their provincial counterparts, and this especially prior to their visits to China. My views on China were also key themes in my public speaking engagements and meetings with the media. With regard to Public Diplomacy, there was only so much that we could do with our human and financial resources. We were at the very early days of the internet and digital media which would blossom in the next half decade. We had in place first attempts at a simple website that advertised public diplomacy activities – mainly artistic and cultural – as well as a targeted audience of 100 key government and private sector contacts who were of long-term importance to Canadian interests. A revitalized Canadian Studies program, targeting Chinese scholars with interests in Canada, was also put in place.

  3. Commercial and Investment Relations Section

    Among the larger functions of the Embassy, Commercial and Investment relations responded to the high priority that the Chrétien foreign policy gave to expanding the economic relationship – in the broadest sense – between China and Canada. It was headed by a Senior Foreign Service Officer who shared with the CBS and LES in the Section extensive trade and economic relations experience. The Section’s responsibilities and performance criteria were measured in two-way trade figures, investment flows, expansion of the range of products and services exchanged between the two trading partners. Nurturing close professional and personal relations with the Canadian business world and Chinese counterparts, including especially the Government ministries and regulatory institutions was also a determinant of the overall performance of the Section.

    It also sought to increase the geographic range of these relationships beyond the economic centers of both countries, for example into the far west of China, as well as engaging Canada’s provinces and two territories. Beyond the Embassy and equally important to the task were the partnership in strategy and tasks with the Consulates in Shanghai, those in South China, based in Hong Kong and Guangzhou, and Chongqing in the Southwest.

    As for the expanding economic relationship with Mongolia – primarily in the mining sector for investment, services and goods – and the highly speculative trade relationship with the DPRK – these were managed from Beijing, with the assistance of Honorary Consul Chris Johnstone covering Mongolia from the capital, Ulaanbaator.

    When I arrived in Beijing, the Trade Section numbered 10 CBS and 10 LES Trade Commissioners. By the third year of my posting, there were 25 on Staff. In addition, the Section collaborated with three Trade Officers from Québec and seven representing Alberta. Export Development Canada was represented by 1 CBS and 1 LES.

    One important task, broadly shared, was ensuring a steady flow of trade, investment and economic information to DFAIT and the Departments which played, then as now, important roles in the Canadian economy – Agriculture and Agrifood Canada, Fisheries and Oceans, as well as related agencies such as the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, StatsCan and so forth.

    Flowing from relationships with these and other Departments and Agencies, the Section was much involved in planning, coordinating and managing the visits of Ministers, Members of Parliament, provincial ministries and municipal governments, CEOs of companies of all shapes and sizes, and members of their Senior Staffs.

    The Section helped create strategies and tactics to open and expand access to Chinese markets, advocating vis-à-vis the Chinese economic Ministries in favour of reforms of the investment and trade rules and regulations in a manner that benefitted Canadian business, and therefore, as the argument went, benefitted China as well. These included notably the Chinese ministries responsible for commerce, agriculture, industry as well as key specialized government bodies responsible, for example, for aviation, food safety, science and technology, and many others.

    Specific to the Section was also responsibility for managing the CIDA Inc program, by which Canadian companies helped deliver CIDA’s ODA objectives on the ground in China. It also provided policy advice on the implementation of the Export Development Canada $70mm concessional Line of Credit.

  4. Immigration and Visa Section

    The Immigration and Visa Program was then as now a major function of the Canadian Embassy and, in various cases, the consulates as well. Not surprising: in 2003 for example, the Program oversaw 50,000 non-immigrant files that include tourists, students, business women and men and so forth, as well as 10,000 immigrant files, either single or as families.

    Overall, the Program was led by a Minister-Counsellor Executive Level 2, who oversaw a staff of 47, with summer students helping clear inevitable backlogs.

    The Key functions of the Section included:

    ❖ 10 or so Immigration staff – the Reception Pool – were on the front line of applicants visiting the Embassy, sorting out objectives and aspirations;

    ❖ an External Client Unit then dealt directly with applicants, in person and through external communication, including the payment of various fees associated with the particular requests of the applicants;

    ❖ an Interpreters pool of seven staff were on hand to deal with Mandarin speakers but also regional dialects, as needed;

    ❖ a Case Review Unit dealt with complex or problematic cases, often arising from documentation inconsistencies or admissibility issues.

    ❖ the Chief Medical Officer oversaw both in-house medical specialists and outside doctors and nurses on contract to address health and related eligibility issues, including those affecting Canadian Staff.

    Also important – indeed at the heart of managing a program of great complexity – was a Registry Coordinator overseeing a Staff of 11 directing the immense quantity of documentation that all immigration and visa programs generate. While each of the 60,000 or so files flow through a system of great complexity, many had features that added to the challenges of managing the program. Among the most common were business people who needed visas ‘right away’, students whose applications were incomplete, ‘visitors’ whose profiles suggested that ‘tourism’ was not their prime objective.

    The Section also managed an adoption program – approximately 1,000 annually – that had a very high profile and an extremely efficient 2 or 3 days processing ability, from the time the babies and their new and happy parents arrived at the Embassy and the babies were medically examined. The Section, particularly the Program Manager, also spent a great deal of time meeting Ministry of Public Security senior officials to discuss the numerous Chinese fugitives in Canada, not least of course Lai Changxing.

    Like all Canadian Ambassadors in every embassy on earth, I received an inexhaustible flow of letters and faxes pleading for assistance in speeding up or jumping over the immigration and visa processes, always for indisputably excellent reasons. Some cases I would discuss with the Minister Counsellor directing the program, for example to contribute additional facts about the cases that were brought to my attention. But that was it: issuing or not issuing the right to travel to Canada and the right to immigrate to Canada were then and are now in the hands of the legally designated Immigration Officers, including those I was fortunate enough to work with in China.

    I wish to thank Dennis Scown, who headed the Section, for providing information and details to enrich this narrative.

  5. Canadian International Development Agency

    CIDA had been engaged with China for 20 years when I arrived in Beijing. This history tracked closely with China’s transition towards being increasingly opened to the outside world and giving priority to economic development consistent with its self-defined ‘socialist market economy’. That objective required not only technological modernization but adopting modern management practices at the level of industry as well as promoting social and institutional reforms. These changes provided Canada with the opportunity for promoting a values agenda consistent with the expectation that ‘reform and opening’ should lead to institutional modernization and public participation. That the CCP and the Chinese government ministries would be the partners in CIDA’s programs was a given. The Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Cooperation Program, the Canada-China Senior Judges Training Program, the Legal Aid and Community-level Legal Service in China Project, the Public Sector Reform program and many others were in full-swing during my years in China. So were human rights projects: Programme to support the Implementation of China’s Women’s Law; the International Human Rights Implementation Project; the Canada-China Cooperation Project for the Ratification and Implementation of Human Rights Covenants in China. These were exemplary of Canada’s human rights and democratic governance promotion objectives. By definition, each program was conducted in close and indeed formal collaboration with Chinese Government Ministries. The Embassy’s CIDA staff was thus more broadly involved in relations management with the Chinese government’s departments and agencies who were in effect partners – from close to distant – in the implementation of these agreed programs. The CIDA Section was led by a Senior Program Manager and staff consisting of 6 CBS and 3 LES. Many non-Embassy Canadians also worked as Program Managers in the field, with numbers varying over time.

    Henri-Paul Normandin, in my day Director of the CIDA Program, provides important insights in his essay at 2001/12.06.
  6. Department of National Defence

    A Colonel in the Canadian Forces served as Military Attaché. The Attaché’s roles and responsibilities were then as they are now multiple. The Attaché represents the Canadian Armed Forces as part of the Embassy team responsible for studying and explaining the defence and security environment within China as well as in the surrounding international environment, with their attendant defence policy implications, and conveying these to DND and DFAIT. The Attaché’s knowledge of Chinese national defence policies and the existing and future capabilities of its military forces – the PLA Ground Force, the People’s Navy, the Chinese Airforce and the Second Artillery Corps (now, the PLA Rocket Force) – all contribute to the shaping of China’s defence posture. This means understanding not only the big picture but also the detail: knowledge of the overall defence strategy, the operational mechanisms and command structure of the PLA, the armaments available to the Chinese military and the capacities of the defence industry. To achieve this, the Attaché in China must develop a personal and professional relationship with the People’s Liberation Army, a misnomer everyone ignores as the PLA unifies land, sea and air forces. Understanding Chinese defence policies, its force posture and Chinese regional security issues and perspectives are thus part of the mandate. In practice as well, the CFMA develops close ties with Attachés of allied country embassies and beyond.

    The Attaché is also tasked to explain Canadian defence policies and doctrines to Chinese counterparts. Promoting and arranging visits by the DND Minister and senior Staff Officers to China and reciprocal visits by their PLA counterparts are very much part of the routine inter-military and defence official contacts and information gathering exercise. The CFMA is at the center of these exchanges.

    The Attaché is also a full member of the Embassy’s senior management team. Their real-world knowledge and often direct experience in dealing with crises – large and small – can contribute immensely to the Embassy’s successful management of its own challenges, as we experienced during the SARS epidemic. The Attaché was an indispensable member of the Embassy’s crisis management team.

    It should be added that the Mongolia was also part of the CFMA’s remit, with a focus on helping to shape that country’s tiny military force in a manner that encouraged their participation in peace keeping.

    Military Police Security Services

    Diplomatic compounds have a status grounded in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, with attendant responsibilities. Ensuring our security at the Embassy was within the purview of DND’s Warrant Officer Team. Canadian Embassies can on occasion be a target for individuals in a hurry to come to Canada or in a hurry to leave their home countries, and decide to enter a Canadian Embassy compound, thinking that it is the fastest way to do one or the other.

    Which it isn’t. Embassies cannot allow themselves to be exit or entry points to the rest of the world. Accordingly, Embassies have persons dedicated to the security of both the Staff and the physical plant, as well as maintaining the functionality of the premises. This includes a role in overseeing entry and exit of the compounds.

    We thus had the benefit of including among our personnel a Warrant Officer team from the Canadian Forces. In addition to the daily oversight of the security situation, the Warrant Officer team took the lead on physical improvements to the Embassy’s perimeter, overseeing improvements in lighting and CCTV coverage, heightening otherwise accessible points along the perimeter wall and so forth. The Chief Warrant Officer also played an important role in keeping the Contingency Planning Document up to date.They also had front line responsibilities of dealing with the Beijing Diplomatic Security Department, a branch of the Ministry of Public Security. This level of security is fine until it isn’t. In the fall of 2003, 44 North Koreans succeeded in their attempt to scale the walls of the Embassy compound as a stopping point on their way to the Republic of Korea.

  7. Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Solicitor General

    The tasks of the RCMP and SolGen were focused on liaising with the Chinese Ministry of Public Security and its various policing arms, and judicial authorities. Their representatives were the most knowledgeable on the immensely complicated Lai Changxing case, which I elaborate separately.

  8. Embassy Administration

    Managing an Embassy of Beijing’s size and variety of government programs required its own Management Program and Team. The numbers alone tell the tale: 18 Canada-based Staff and 81 Locally Engaged employees, a third of whom were expats.

    Headed by a senior ranked DFAIT Foreign Service Officer- female when I arrived and male when I left – admin functions included managing a large property portfolio which included three office buildings, the OR, 18 staff quarters in the Embassy compound and 40 additional leased residential properties. Human resource management was particularly complex as the mix of Expats from a variety of nationalities worked in the Beijing labour market, while the Diplomatic Service Bureau employees were under the authority of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, with a different set of terms and conditions of employment.

    The Accounting Section headed by a Finance Officer was responsible not only for the Embassy but the Consulates in Chongqing and Guangzhou. In terms of big numbers however, Finance managed the flow of revenues, primarily from the Immigration Section and to a lesser extent the Consular Section, in the order of over $20 million a year: visas aren’t free! The Consular Services Program had a small staff – two officers – and a big role: providing passport and citizenship services both to visiting and resident Canadians. At the time, 8 of those residents were guests of Chinese penal institutions. They were visited on a quarterly basis by Consular Staff.

DPRK

The Political Section staff assisted me on DPRK issues, including my future engagement.

Who could not be intrigued with the possibility – however implausible – that the DPRK might slowly adapt and respond to the post-Cold War potential – however belated – of a slight opening of the doors to the West, seeking a degree of economic integration and people-to-people exchanges. After all, China is right next door and everyone sees what it has achieved with Reform and Opening. As Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) for Asia and having earlier negotiated the bilateral rules of engagement with the DPRK, I was open to the notion that progress in the relationship was possible, however glacial. The alternative could potentially be deadly: another Korean peninsula war would be devastating from all perspectives. Canadian policy and attendant Embassy efforts were marshalled to help open the DPRK doors a bit, even as illusions of what was achievable were kept in check. Dialogue with the DPRK would be on the potential for bilateral trade, however modest, cultural exchanges, however circumscribed, political relations and possible visits, however distant on the horizon. No illusions, but working nevertheless within modest parameters. Canada was already an important contributor to the World Food Program’s projects in the DPRK, with Canadian grain clearly identified at FAO outlets throughout the country. (We’ll see about that a bit later.) A small number of remarkable Canadians were in the DPRK, working for foreign NGOs already on the ground in North Korea, mostly involved in health and medical education. These were eyes-wide-open activists propelled by the valid objective of doing what they and Canada could to help the North Korean people. The groundwork was in place. The issues under discussion at the Embassy focused on step-by-step approaches to both expanding and deepening the horizons.…

…to which I can add an anecdote. On the death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994, the Prime Minister’s Office – members of which were with the PM in Naples for the G7 Summit – decided that the Governor General should issue a brief message of condolence on KIS’ demise. They passed the ball to me as, at the time, I was the North Asia Director at DFAIT. Canada not having diplomatic relations with the DPRK, I seriously doubted the appropriateness of the instructions I had received and sought to alert my DFAIT Superiors of this unusual request. It was a Saturday however so – in those pre-email days – I could only leave voice mails. Another call from Naples put me to work. Absent formal diplomatic links with the DPRK, I addressed the message to the People of North Korea, expressing sympathy for their feelings – whatever they might be – on the passing of their ‘Great Leader’, to use their term. (I can’t recall the exact text, and neither can ChatGPT.) I brought my draft to Rideau Hall, the Governor General Ray Hnatyshyn’s residence. The message was released by the GG….and not surprisingly, it led to a short-lived firestorm from many, many Canadians, not least our Veterans of the Korean War, as well as Official Opposition Leader Stephen Harper who issued this statement  “Kim Jong Il will be remembered as the leader of a totalitarian regime who violated the basic rights of the North Korean people for nearly two decades. We hope his passing brings positive change allowing the people of North Korea to emerge from six decades of isolation, oppression and misery. … At this critical juncture, we urge North Korea to close this sad chapter in its history and to work once more towards promoting both the well-being of its people and stability on the Korean peninsula.” 

Fast forward to September 2000. Canada has decided to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. As Assistant Deputy Minister for Asia, I am tasked to lead the negotiations on details with a DPRK delegation. Our meetings took place at the St. Regis Hotel in Beijing over the course of a week. These encounters between Officials when dealing with – say, a trade dispute – have their official ‘sitting across the table’ discussions, and their ‘unofficial chit-chats’, while taking a coffee break (or, in the day, having a smoke). It was during one of the breaks that my French-speaking North Korean counterpart – in response to my question about what had prompted their interest in relations with Canada – told me that it was the Governor General’s message of condolence on the death of Kim Il-Sung. Previously, Canada had not figured on their diplomatic horizon, but the message got them thinking, and ultimately lead to our successful negotiations in a Beijing Hotel. Who would have guessed?

And for the record, during the negotiations, my counterpart also demonstrated his own diplomatic skills. Former Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau had passed away in Montreal on Tuesday the 18th of September, something we learned overnight in Beijing. Before beginning the official discussions the next morning, I stood up at the negotiating table and informed the North Koreans of our previous PM’s death, spoke briefly about his career and huge impact on Canada and Canadians. My counter-part then stood up, and in admirable diplomatic form, expressed the deep condolences of his delegation and the sympathy of all North Koreans on the passing of… of…, and, since he had no idea about whom I was speaking, said ‘such a distinguished person’, or something along those lines. He was certainly good at the game.

Arts and Culture

Letter to Canadian violinist Lara St-John congratulating her for her performance the previous evening at the Forbidden City Concert Hall. Invited her for lunch.

ChinaPs&Cs

Letter to Bo Xilai, Liaoning Provincial People’s Government, reflecting on previous week’s APEC Senior Officials’ Meeting in Dalian. Also flagged is an issue regarding SNC-Lavalin in Shenyang.

Échange de lettres avec Président-DG des Manufacturiers et Exportateurs du Québec, Paul-Arthur Huot, au sujet de plans de visite en Chine.

Exchange with Secretary of State (Asia-Pacific) Rey Pagtakhan on my assignment to the PRC.

Exchange with Ted Lipman, Minister at Canada’s representative office in Taipei, regarding collaboration with the Embassy on political, economic, public and cultural affairs programmes.

Lettre au Sous-Ministre du MAECI Gaétan Lavertu au sujet de sa visite promise en décembre.

Tuesday, August 28

CdaGov

Échange de lettre avec l’Honorable André Ouellet, Président, Société canadienne des postes, me félicitant pour ma nomination comme ambassadeur.

Meetings

  • with Political Section staff on DPRK issues and my future engagement, including the forthcoming visit to Pyongyang to present credentials.
  • with individual Program Directors.
  • initial planning for Embassy Program Directors’ Retreat.

Wednesday, August 29

Meeting with Australian Ambassador – and next door neighbour – David Irvine.

If there is one constant for Canadian diplomats around the world, it is the quasi-automatic connections leading to friendships with our Australian and New Zealand counterparts, and this not only at the ambassadorial level. As Commonwealth members, as former colonies that became very successful societies and economies, as countries with about the closest relations possible with Britain and the US, as consumers of British entertainment and popular music, and so on and so forth, there is an ease of association leading almost inevitably to long-lasting friendships, notably at the ground-level in our assigned foreign capitals. Another example: I spent two years studying Japanese at the US State Department Language School in Yokohama, Japan in the mid-‘70s. The non-Americans in the school were Australians, New Zealanders and Canadians, so long-lasting links were established early in my career. Relationships between Canadians and Australians in Beijing were also strengthened by the fact that we were next door neighbours.

Thursday, August 30

APEC

Preparations were well underway for the forthcoming 9th Leaders’ meeting in Shanghai. The principal agenda items included the multilateral trading system, the impact of the Asian financial crisis, the Action Agenda on the New Economy – a series of recommendations for increased intra-APEC member trade facilitation, human capacity building and public engagement.

Given my continuing status as Senior Official, I had the opportunity to provide my thoughts on the future of APEC, and this to the PM on down. That said, post the Shanghai meeting, my APEC cred would soon be supplanted by the views of my successors. I thought it useful therefore to provide to my colleagues my views on APEC as a departing official. Accordingly, I briefed along the following lines:

  • depending on one’s point of view, APEC either had great strengths or great weaknesses; in fact, like most things, it had both. The critique of APEC arose from one’s expectations: either APEC meets them or it doesn’t.
  • definitely, APEC had strengths: most Leaders like APEC and consider it successful in that their annual meeting plays an indispensable role as a forum for the Asia-Pacific; there was no comparable opportunity for political level dialogue. From the Canadian point of view, our “transaction costs” would be greatly increased if, in the absence of the Leaders’ Meeting, we sought nevertheless to maintain the same regional profile at the Ministers’ level. In fact, it wouldn’t happen. In Asia, foreign policy is dependent to a very important degree on personal contact at the highest levels; the annual Leaders Meeting and the Ministerials provided, then as now, interaction – formal and informal – in the most efficient way possible.
  • furthermore, APEC was (and remains) one venue where the general objectives – economic growth and prosperity – are shared by everyone. This tied in with Canada’s priorities: a healthy and open multilateral trading system that adapted to changes in the global economy; moving forward towards the launch of new WTO negotiations, envisaged at the forthcoming Ministerial Conference in Doha; strengthening the capacity of developing economies to participate in and benefit from the WTO system and so forth.
  • APEC was not without weaknesses: it had too many files, and in contrast with the G-8, discussions among APEC Leaders did not always have the kind of immediacy that G-8 Leaders could tackle if the politics were right, and thus make real things happen.
  • for developing country members on the other hand, APEC served as an important vehicle for channeling and receiving aid and technical assistance. Happily, CIDA was willing to support APEC initiatives that fitted its mandate.
  • all that said, I felt that it was necessary to accept the reality that APEC would always have its limitations, and not pretend that it could be otherwise, given the limited strategic role that its members accorded to it.

…or so I thought…

Meetings:

  • Program Directors.

BT&I

John Cheh, senior Bombardier executive in Asia, provided an update on Bombardier’s interests and activities in China: the role of State Planning and Development Commission, whose approval was necessary for regional jet purchases; internal ‘geographic’ markets for mid-size passenger jets; relationship with Chinese aircraft manufacturer AVIC 1; foreign competitors, viz. Fairchild and Embraer; the subway market and Bombardier strategies; the anticipated visits of Bombardier executives; the importance of personal relations with top level Ministers in PRC Government.  

Bombardier’s regional aircraft sales aspirations, as well as manufacturing projects in China for air and rail, were ambitious and in many respects, during the decade, very successful.

Friday, August 31

Échange avec l’Honorable Sénateur Dan Hays au sujet de ma nomination comme Ambassadeur.

Meetings with Program Directors.

BT&I

Note from the Trade Section’s Rosaline Kwan re the forthcoming PT/Wireless and Networks Comm China 2001. At the time, it was among the most influential and largest telecom events in China, one of many other such gatherings.

Lettre du Directeur du Bureau International de l’Université Laval à l’égard de visas.