December, 2002
Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo and Canada’s support…China’s Friendship Award…Arts&Culture…
Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo and Canada’s support…China’s Friendship Award…Arts&Culture…
In the letter, I added the following: ‘I can confirm, in confidence, that Canada voted for the Shanghai bid. This Canadian support, which extended to the highest levels of the Canadian Government, is consistent with the strong bilateral relations between Canada and China.
‘In addition, our Consulate in Shanghai, together with the Shanghai Municipal Government, sponsored a workshop, based on the success of Vancouver’s Expo 86, on how to plan for the legacy aspects of a world expo.’
However, the Consulate’s engagement in Canada’s decision to support Shanghai for the 2010 Expo was much deeper than that. That is best explained by Stewart Beck, then Consul General, in the following Essay:
A Vote for Us, A Vote for You: Advancing Canadian Interests
Stewart Beck, Canadian Consul General, Shanghai 1999-2003
During his Canadian Foreign Service Career, Stewart Beck held senior positions in foreign policy and trade, including Canada’s High Commissioner to India, Consul General in Shanghai and San Francisco, as well as Assistant Deputy Minister for International Business Development, Investment and Innovation. Following his retirement from the Foreign Service, he served for seven years as President and CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.
Stewart:
Looking back, the China of the early 2000s represented a very different moment for Canada. Following China’s WTO entry, widespread optimism marked its integration into the global economy and emergence as a constructive international partner. Western nations viewed China’s rapid development primarily as an opportunity rather than a challenge, and engagement was the watchword of the day. While today’s geopolitical landscape and attitudes toward China have shifted dramatically, the fundamental lessons about understanding Chinese decision-making and relationship-building remain relevant for diplomats and business leaders. As China emerged into the 21st century, nowhere was its transformation more evident than in Shanghai, where massive infrastructure development included plans for over 200 kilometers of new subway lines in just a decade.
This infrastructure boom, combined with China’s rapidly growing aviation market, aligned perfectly with Canadian capabilities, particularly through Bombardier’s position as a global leader in both rail transportation and regional aircraft. Despite Bombardier’s worldwide expertise in urban transit systems, the company had previously been unsuccessful in securing contracts for Shanghai’s metro system. European competitors had established strong footholds – Siemens had delivered 584 metro cars to Lines 1 and 2, while Alstom’s breakthrough 1999 contract for Line 3 had secured an order for 168 Metropolis metro cars, leading to strategic joint ventures strengthening its local presence. For a Canadian Consul General, this situation presented both a challenge and an opportunity – how to help a leading Canadian company break into a market dominated by entrenched European players. While traditional diplomatic caution might have suggested a more passive approach, the scale of opportunity demanded creative engagement and calculated risk-taking
Canada’s unique position among G7 nations reflected decades of constructive engagement with China. Our relationship was built on a foundation of significant historical moments – from Norman Bethune’s service during the revolution, which earned lasting respect from Mao Zedong, to Canada’s early recognition of the People’s Republic of China in 1970, our support for China’s entry into the United Nations, and our diplomatic innovation in developing a ‘One China’ formula that balanced relations with Taiwan. This goodwill positioned Canada in a uniquely privileged role, enabling us to achieve levels of access and trust that sometimes surpassed even those of the United States, despite our smaller economy and geopolitical weight. In fact, the U.S. Consul General frequently noted the contrast between my relatively easy access to Shanghai’s senior leadership and his comparatively difficult interactions.
Chinese officials and business leaders viewed Canada as a friendly, trustworthy partner, offering us opportunities for engagement that weren’t always available to other Western nations. The government’s commitment to strengthening Canada-China relations, demonstrated through multiple Team Canada missions led by the Prime Minister and including premiers and business leaders, had already established a strong foundation for deeper engagement. These missions had been particularly appreciated by Chinese leadership as concrete evidence of Canada’s commitment to the bilateral relationship.
In 1989, Shanghai became the first major Asian city to establish an economic forum – the International Business Leaders Advisory Council (IBLAC) – which brought together CEOs from the world’s leading multinational enterprises to advise the city’s leadership on development. Unlike typical government-business forums, IBLAC provided direct access to Shanghai’s mayor and key municipal leaders, with party officials notably absent from its sessions. Membership was highly prestigious; when I arrived in Shanghai Canada did not have a member on the Council and the membership came with strict obligations – two consecutive absences meant automatic removal.
A series of personal connections would prove critical in leveraging this influential forum for Canadian interests. AIG’s CEO, Hank Greenberg, was responsible for organizing the forum and recommending new Council members. Fortunately, a Canadian connection emerged – the son of AIG’s Canadian CEO for Asia happened to live in the same Shanghai apartment building as the Official Residence for the Consul General. Through this neighborly connection, I was able to establish a relationship with his father. Greenberg was hesitant about putting a Canadian on the Council because Nortel’s CEO had been asked to step down for missing two consecutive meetings. But, through my new relationship with AIG’s Asia CEO, I was able to make the case for Bombardier CEO Bob Brown, while ensuring Bob understood the seriousness of the commitment. Bob’s background as a former senior Canadian government official, combined with his corporate leadership role, made him an ideal candidate who understood both the business and diplomatic dimensions of the role. And, more importantly, access to Shanghai’s senior leadership through IBLAC would allow Brown and Bombardier the opportunity to pursue its commercial interests with the city.
Shanghai was in the running to host the 2010 World’s Fair and securing the bid was clearly a priority for China. Canada’s support was seen as critical given our outsized influence at the BIE, demonstrated through successful hosting of Expo 67 in Montreal, and Expo 86 in Vancouver. Moreover, the Bureau International des Expositions (BIE) delegation evaluating Shanghai’s bid was led by a Canadian, adding another layer of credibility. This provided Shanghai officials with additional confidence in our assessment of their bid’s strength and viability and gave us leverage with senior Chinese officials, as Canada’s support carried weight given our World’s Fair experience and direct involvement in the evaluation process.
However, the challenge was significant. Canada’s Heritage Minister had indicated her support for Korea’s World Expo bid, and while this wasn’t public knowledge, shifting this position to support Shanghai would require careful diplomatic handling. After consulting with my political colleague in Beijing, it became clear that success would depend not just on the strength of our arguments, but on how we framed the shift. The key was to position any change as a natural evolution of Canada’s broader relationship with China, particularly in the dynamic Yangtze Delta region, rather than as a choice between competing bids.
Working through multiple channels would be crucial to this effort. As CEO of Bombardier, a major Quebec-based multinational and important domestic player, Bob Brown had his own access to senior decision-makers in Ottawa. Meanwhile, another personal connection provided rare direct access to the Prime Minister’s Office. The Prime Minister’s Director of Policy had lived down the street from us, and his wife had provided daycare for our two boys. These family ties enabled a crucial meeting that might not otherwise have been possible. During that meeting, I presented our comprehensive strategic case, hoping it would reach the key decision-maker, the Prime Minister. Shanghai’s rapid development, the scale of opportunities for Canadian business, and our unique position as a trusted G7 partner all pointed toward the strategic value of supporting Shanghai’s bid.
The evolution of Shanghai’s approach to securing Canada’s support became clear through two crucial mayoral meetings. At the 2001 IBLAC meeting, Bob Brown had a private session with then-Mayor Xu Kuang Di. The mayor laid the groundwork, exploring the broader opportunities that Shanghai’s development presented. Mayor Xu outlined Shanghai’s ambitious development plan and the potential for expanded Canada-Shanghai cooperation. The discussion focused on the scale of opportunity – Shanghai’s metro system infrastructure needs, its aviation sector development, and the transformative impact the World Expo could have on the city.
By September 2002, at the time of the next IBLAC meeting, the new mayor (who also served as Party Secretary), moved the bilateral discussion with Brown from exploration to specific linkages. This meeting was strategically timed to coincide with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Bombardier and the Shanghai Aviation Industries Corporation (SAIC) for the assembly of CRJ700/900 series aircraft. The meeting’s composition reflected its heightened importance – the Shanghai side included the Executive Vice Mayor, chairs of four Municipal Commissions including the Economic Commission, and senior SAIC officials.
The mayor began by outlining Shanghai’s qualifications for hosting the World Expo, then smoothly transitioned to discussing the enormous opportunities in transportation infrastructure – over 200 kilometers of new urban rail lines planned for the next decade, plus the aircraft needed to bring visitors to Expo 2010. Then came the moment that crystallized the reciprocal nature of Chinese decision-making. Switching to English for emphasis, the mayor stated simply but clearly: “a vote for us is a vote for you.” The message was diplomatic yet unmistakable – support for Shanghai’s Expo bid would create an environment conducive to success in future procurement decisions.
This was Chinese relationship-building at its most sophisticated – no explicit promises, but a clear vision of mutual benefit wrapped in the broader context of strengthening bilateral relations. Similarly, while our strategy was in place and networking complete, I never received prior confirmation that we had shifted our support – interesting but not surprising given how these decisions typically unfold.
In December 2002, just days after Shanghai won the Expo bid, Bombardier secured a contract worth $121 million for 60 metro cars for Shanghai’s subway system. The timing and speed of this development was striking – while the potential order had been known since early November, serious negotiations didn’t begin until after Shanghai won the Expo bid. What happened next was unprecedented: the deal was completed in just seven days, which the General Manager of Shengtong Holdings (the metro system’s owner) noted was the fastest negotiation in Shanghai Metro’s history.
The significance of Canada’s support was underscored at the mayor’s celebratory reception following the announcement of Shanghai’s successful bid. In a telling moment, the mayor took me aside and specifically noted Canada’s support, mentioning that China’s representative sat beside Canada’s delegate at the Bureau International des Expositions. He pointed out that the Chinese official had carefully observed Canada’s support through all four rounds of voting. This kind of detailed attention to diplomatic gestures – noting not just the support but tracking it through each voting round – exemplified how Chinese officials value the nature and significance of this type of diplomatic effort.
The Director General of Shanghai’s Expo Bidding Office further confirmed the success of our strategy. He acknowledged that Canada’s Consulate General had been the most active foreign mission in promoting Shanghai’s bid, and notably, we were the first to offer congratulations after the success of the bid. He made it clear that Canada’s support would “not be forgotten and would work to our future potential advantage” – a statement that, in Chinese diplomatic parlance, indicated real opportunities ahead.
The successful outcome validated our strategic approach to diplomatic engagement while illustrating several key principles about how decisions are made in China. The sequence of events – from relationship building through IBLAC, to the carefully calibrated mayoral meetings, to the rapid conclusion of the Bombardier contract – demonstrated the interconnected nature of business and government relationships in China. Also, China’s careful tracking of Canada’s support through each voting round demonstrated their attention to every detail.
Yet it would be overly simplistic to draw direct correlations between diplomatic support and business success. What this episode demonstrated was how creating the right environment through careful relationship building could help position Canadian companies for success. The Bombardier contract not only had immediate value but, as company officials noted, positioned them strongly for upcoming bids on Shanghai Metro lines 4 and 5. The unprecedented speed of the contract negotiations – seven days from start to finish – suggested that while the technical and commercial aspects had to be sound, the broader relationship environment could significantly influence the pace of decision-making.
The experience yielded several key insights about effective engagement in China. First, the importance of working at multiple levels simultaneously – from informal neighborhood connections that opened doors to the Prime Minister’s Office, to securing Bob Brown’s position on IBLAC through apartment building friends, to maintaining close contact with Shanghai officials. Second, the value of Canada’s unique position as a friendly G7 nation, which allowed us to be seen as a trusted partner without historical baggage. Third, the critical role of timing and patience – the groundwork laid through the 2001 mayoral meeting and subsequent relationship building created the foundation for the more specific discussions in 2002.
Perhaps most importantly, the episode demonstrated that successful diplomatic engagement in China requires understanding the indirect nature of decision-making. The mayor’s careful phrase – “a vote for us is a vote for you” – exemplified this approach. It was clear enough to signal real opportunity while maintaining appropriate diplomatic ambiguity. Our political colleagues in Beijing had advised precisely this kind of careful positioning, avoiding any appearance of transactional decision-making while allowing natural relationship building to create favorable conditions for Canadian interests.
The Shanghai World Expo experience validated the role of the Consul General and the Consulate as active relationship builders, demonstrating how understanding Chinese decision-making processes, combined with strategic networking and timing, could advance both diplomatic and commercial objectives. The results – from the Bombardier contract to broader future opportunities – showed that working within local practices while maintaining appropriate diplomatic protocols could create significant advantages for Canadian interests. Most importantly, it demonstrated how understanding and using leverage – in this case, our World Fair expertise and BIE connections – is crucial for successful negotiations in an Asian environment.
The initial $121 million contract proved to be just the beginning for Bombardier Mass Transit in Shanghai. Over the years, Bombardier would deliver more than 1,122 metro cars to the Shanghai Metro system and 300 next generation automated cars to the network. By 2010, contracts worth over $1.2 billion included major orders for Lines 7, 9, and 12. The success extended beyond Bombardier, creating significant benefits throughout the Canadian economy. Manufacturing of key components like propulsion systems remained in Canada, supporting high-value jobs particularly in Québec and Ontario, while Canadian suppliers to Bombardier also benefited from the expanded business.
This broader economic impact was amplified by Canadian companies securing significant World Fair contracts – from Vancouver architect Bing Thom’s master plan for the entire Expo site, to SNC-Lavalin’s development of the Canada Pavilion and Cirque du Soleil’s cultural programming. What began as an order for 60 metro cars grew into a broader Canadian success story, validating the value of diplomatic engagement and pursuit of national interests.
I have no doubt whatsoever that the Canadian support for Shanghai’s bid was very much the result of the efforts of Consul General Beck and his colleagues at the Consulate, with the long-term results quite evident from the Essay.
Not surprisingly, the 2010 expo was a spectacular success. According to some sources, total attendance was over 73 million. I did not attend the fair in 2010, but a subsequent trip to Shanghai a year later offered an opportunity to visit some of the ‘legacy’ pavilions. It’s fair enough to think of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and 2010 Expo to which I would add the 2013 launch of China’s Belt and Road initiative as elements of modern China’s ‘coming out party’. These, along with the urban skylines and the trade and investment figures and outward-going FDI left no doubt – if there was still some doubt – that China had arrived.
The Development Research Center is part of the State Council of the PRC, the most senior administrative authority of the Government. In Canadian terms, it would be called the Cabinet, but including a broader set of governance institutions emerging from the National People’s Congress. Regrettably, I have no notes of our discussion, reflecting the fact that the discussion was animated and left little time for note-taking.
China’s government and the private sector were increasingly public in their concerns about domestic and global environment issues. The publication of GCTN could – should it be both accurate and widely available – increase public awareness of the nuts and bolts of trading of petroleum and other sources of carbon.
Out of interest, I obtained a list of the 39 Canadian recipients of China’s ‘Friendship Award’ between 1992 and 2002, 4 women and 35 men. The ‘Award’, established in the 1950s, was given to ‘foreign experts who have made outstanding contributions to China’s economic and social progress’. One that I got to know was Walter Redekop, an ur-expert in the development of agriculture. He had spent 15 years on CIDA projects in China.
(https://ottawacitizen.remembering.ca/obituary/walter-redekop-1066319326)
The Award should not be confused with the ‘Friendship Medal’, established in 2015, and given to foreign nationals who contributed to China’s ‘socialist modernization, the promotion of exchange and cooperation between China and foreign countries, and the protection of world peace’. One wonders what contribution to world peace was made by the medal’s first recipient: Vladimir Putin.
I had invited, for our guests’ enjoyment, Chinese lute player Pipa, whose performance I had earlier heard in one of Beijing’s many music clubs.
David and I had a catch-up breakfast, followed by the weekly Mission Agendas Meeting. It illustrated the usual mix of day-to-day issues that engage the Embassy Staff, a lot of it humdrum, with some more central to our work: forthcoming visit of CIDA Minister Susan Whelan, problems providing up-to-date translations of commercial intelligence, financial and personnel resource issues, Québec immigration program visit, transparency and cooperation with educational institutions recruiting Chinese students, the security situation at the Mission. The Consulates flagged some of their preoccupations: HongKong/strategic priorities review; Shanghai/nuclear energy seminar, high level visits; Guangzhou/Hainan visit, DPRK refugees, immigration issues, and so forth. In other words: BAU.
Hosted dinner in the evening for our senior MFA interlocutors, Vice Minister Zhou Wenzhong and Director General of North American and Oceanic Affairs, He Yafei, who would also become Vice Minister in 2008. Also included were representatives of Canadian companies based in Beijing. And because David was the lead host for the event and thus VM Zhou’s interlocutor, I was able to take notes of the discussion.
The discussion focused on China’s relationship with the DPRK;
The good Senator had to leave the dinner, due to ill-health. Back in Canada, he was diagnosed as suffering from a mild kidney ailment, but I was able to reassure Co-Chair Jiang that Jack had fully recovered, and passed on Jack’s message expressing his great regrets that he had to cut short the dinner, but looked forward to future opportunities to meet along with other CCLA colleagues.
I informed him that Susan Whelan, Minister for International Cooperation, was planning to visit several countries in Asia in January, and that she wished to include China among her destinations. The purpose of the visit would be to review the Canada-China development cooperation program and meet with Chinese Officials and program partners.
My letter included proposed calls on 1) MoFTEC, to discuss development issues arising from China’s accession to the WTO, and sign several memoranda of understanding on new cooperation projects. 2)a call on a State Councillor; 3) a one day visit to Xi’an, to include a visit to the Sino-Canadian Dairy Project village, 4) meet with a Shaanxi government leader, 5) visit a Canada Fund school reconstruction project and 6) view the Terra Cotta Warriors site. I sought the Vice-Minister’s concurrence and added that the Embassy would follow-up with MoFTEC’s Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs re details of the visit.
I pointed out that Alcatel was recognized worldwide as a leading supplier of advanced signalling and control products. Alcatel had already succeeded in penetrating the market through involvement with the Kowloon Canton Railway Corporation and the MTR Corporation in Hong Kong. I went on to provide additional technical details. The Embassy proposed organizing a presentation by Alcatel Canada to Guangzhou on its capabilities in providing state-or-the-art equipment for major rail and urban transit projects. A similar letter went to the President of Guangzhou Metro.
It was a matter of judgement as to what form the Embassy would choose to indicate Canadian Government support for Canadian firms’ business objectives and activities. Connecting to the ‘political class’, that is the Government in Beijing, as well as provincial and municipal governments, was very much a responsibility of the Embassy and Consulates. How, who and in what way this outreach would be effective was very much – and here, I am employing a Japanese phrase – ‘kayssu by kayssu’. Something as significant as a transportation project – notable by its size but also strategic importance to the Chinese sponsors – merited intervention from the top, that ‘top’ being from the Prime Minister on down.
Ayant expliqué au Ministre, comme à ses collègues, les résultats du congrès du PCC, j’élabore ce qui l’intéressera surtout : l’état de l’économie de la Chine. Je signale d’abord que la première année de la Chine comme membre de l’OMC a été très positive. Les statistiques des trois premiers trimestres indiquent que les exportations chinoises ont augmenté de 19%, les importations de 17%, l’investissement directe étranger en Chine est en hausse de 23% et le produit intérieur brut augmente de 7.9%. L’intérêt du Canada pour cet important marché qui se développe rapidement demeure élevé. Il nous faudra, de façon à soutenir cet intérêt, continuer à échanger et travailler avec les dirigeants chinois. L’accession à l’OMC et les réformes des règlements en marche ont changé beaucoup de choses, mais l’influence du Gouvernement du Canada demeure important. Les obstacles administratifs auxquels font face les fournisseurs Canadiens des biens et services comptent sur l’appui de l’Ambassade et les Consulats.
J’ai ajouté une note personnelle espérant qu’il visitera la Chine en 2003, afin qu’il rencontre ses homologues et continue de construire les liens stratégiques essentiels à nos politiques à l’égard de la Chine.
Il m’a fait plaisir ajouter ces mots, car Pierre et moi étaient liés d’amitié depuis bien des années, du fait que nous avions travaillé les deux au Secrétariat des Affaires Étrangères et la Défense au Conseil Privé, le petit regroupement de conseillers auprès du Premier Ministre, à l’occurrence, le PM Pierre Trudeau, nous sous l’égide de Robert Fowler, le conseiller principal du PM en matière des affaires étrangères.
My conversation with Dr. Dobie touched primarily on the terms and conditions of the Embassy nurse’s work. It also served to flag that increasing numbers of Canadians based in Beijing were seeking medical advice and that in English.
Again, host’s disadvantage: you can’t be the host and note taker at the same time. One can guess that, first and foremost would be the 2003 agenda in the Canada/China relations calendar, but also Chinese foreign policies and current events – US response to 9/11 including the Afghanistan invasion and search for Osama bin Laden, instability in Asia viz the Nepalese civil war and India/Pakistan tensions over Kashmir.
Discussions focused on 2003 visits calendar: another possible PM visit? To discuss with Claude Laverdure, Foreign and Defence Secretariat and PM’s senior foreign policy adviser; high level business missions; Vancouver South MP Herb Dhaliwal; Finance Minister John Manley; Minister of International Trade Pierre Pettigrew; Victoria MP David Anderson; Premier of Nova Scotia John Hamm.
Exchange of letters with the Director of the Canada Council for the Arts, Shirley Thomson.
Madame Thomson had visited China in the fall. For her and the Delegation, the visit was an eye opener, ‘enriching and instructive’. It revealed to the CCA the extraordinary wealth of opportunities for cultural exchange between Canada and China. She expressed the hope that the visit would promote extensive cultural dialogue. And the visit had indeed been productive: two groups from China had visited Ottawa, including a delegation from the Ministry of Culture. A signed MoU was one of the products of the visit. A delegation from the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles was expected in 2003 which promised to lead to artists exchanges, residencies and exhibitions.
In response, I flagged my personal commitment to the CCA’s and Madame Thomson’s objectives. I wrote that during another extended outreach program in Canada in September and October, I met with many cultural organizations and individuals (as indicated in my 11.22 schedule). I informed Dr. Thomson that the Embassy had almost completed a report on the internationalization of the arts and cultural institutions and markets in China, and will outline promotion strategies linking China and Canada. To that end – and as she was aware – I was convening a one day conference in Ottawa on Friday, March 7. The purpose of the gathering was to assemble leading Canadian cultural institutions and to invite them to outline their respective interests, as well as initiatives that would contribute to furthering Canada-China ties among their artistic clients. I would be encouraging the attendance to establish an ongoing network of institutions with special interest in promoting Canada-China cultural and artistic relations.
I also informed her that I would be assembling the Heads of Mission of Greater China – the Consulates as well as Hong Kong and Taipei – for a strategy session in the New Year.
Travel to and outreach program in Shenyang, largest city and capital of Liaoning Province.
Regrettably, no notes of my conversation with Governor Bo Xilai. As mentioned earlier, he was the Chinese politician with whom I developed the closest relationship, from first meeting him at the APEC Senior Officials’ meeting in September 2001, visits to Lioaning and especially following his appointment as Minister of Commerce, 2004-2007. Those were his good years…
By email to my Heads of Mission colleagues in ‘Greater China’, I invited them to plan to attend a meeting in Shanghai on January 27, to discuss the development and implementation of the Greater China Public Diplomacy Strategy, as I called it. It would be the follow-up to the initial meeting of January ’02, which led to the drafting and circulation of a deck on the Strategy and the subsequent setting of operational priorities. I informed them of plans for a gathering of Canadian cultural institutions and agencies with an active interest in China for March 7, in Ottawa.
The objective of the forthcoming Shanghai meeting was to discuss how we, as the senior managers in the region, could make full and effective use of public diplomacy in all of its aspects to achieve better results for our clients in a rapidly changing China. I felt, and knew from discussions with my colleagues, that public diplomacy could contribute to the delivery and reception of Canadian interests and programs in China. A meeting would provide a venue for sharing views on the methods and tools of public diplomacy, and that I expected full attendance at the meeting.
Return to Beijing.
Kumru and I hosted a Christmas buffet dinner – with piano and violin accompaniment for 93 guests consisting of the Embassy’s Canadian staff with spouses, but also including the visiting President of Mount Royal College, Dr. Thomas Wood and members of his staff, as well as two of his students, Chu Yue and Chen Xi, pianist and violinist of age 12, already very promising musicians. A fantastic evening, for me, never to be forgotten.
Not a surprise at all, given the quality of the Commercial Section Staff…but nice to read the appreciation as well.
This was a very sad, unredeemable story. Amanda Zhao was a 21 year old student from Shaanxi Province, studying at Coquitlam College outside Vancouver. She was reported missing on October 9, 2002. Her body was found 11 days later. The autopsy revealed that she had been strangled to death. Two suspects, her boyfriend and the latter’s cousin, were sought. The boyfriend – the alleged murderer – had returned to China precipitously, but 7 years later was arrested in China and convicted of her murder. However, his incarceration was limited by a decision of the Supreme Court of Beijing. The cousin was charged and convicted in BC as an accessory but was acquitted by the provincial Supreme Court over issues regarding his confession. The case raised complex sets of legal considerations because of the differing conclusions on what, indeed, were the details of the murder, investigative procedures and the Canadian and Chinese differences of views on matters such as evidence and Canada’s disallowance of the death penalty. All and all a tragic death with complex outcomes.
The tragedy of Amanda’s death was further brought to me when I met her Parents in my office in Beijing. Tearfully, they pleaded with me to accelerate the processes and procedures necessary to transfer evidence held in Canada to the Chinese legal authorities, so as to speed up the boyfriend’s conviction in a Chinese court. Other than reporting the meeting to Ottawa, there was nothing that I could do to provide succor to the parents, beyond expressions of profound sympathy, profoundly inadequate these were…
I addressed a letter to my most important Chinese interlocutors in the economic and trade ministries, congratulating them for their work since China formally joined the WTO in December 2001, as per:
‘China’s accession to the WTO last year was a historic event for the world trading system and a very important step in China’s process of economic reform. It has taken (and will take) much work to implement all of the commitments that China made as part of accession, but I believe that the positive impact of WTO accession on China’s long term economic prospects will make this effort well worthwhile.
Trade is essential for Canada, and last year, China was our third largest trading partner. As China implements its WTO commitments, I hope to see further increases in two-way trade and investment between Canada and China.
I also believe that China has an important role to play in the WTO, both in the day-to-day work of this organization and in supporting progress on the Doha Development Agenda. Canada looks forward to continued cooperation on both these fronts.
Congratulations on a historic first year as a WTO Member.’
I sent a letter of thanks to each of the Canadian and Chinese businesses and organizations which supported the Terry Fox Run:
‘I am writing to thank-you again for your support of this year’s Terry Fox Run and for the photos you sent from that day. You will be pleased to know that over 12,000 people participated in this year’s run in Beijing and close to RMB700,000 was raised for the Beijing Cancer Research Institute. In Shanghai, more than 10,000 people participated.
The Terry Fox Run has two goals: to raise money for cancer research and to convey the message of Terry Fox’s heroic actions to people around the world. I think we can be proud of what was achieved this year in Beijing in both of these areas. I look forward to building on this success in the years to come.’
The end of the year provided a timely opportunity to assess the first year of China’s accession to the WTO. Our conclusions included the following points:
Email to ADM David Mulroney in which I outlined the need for additional resources in Beijing and the ConGens on the mainland necessary to implement the Greater China Public Diplomacy Strategy, following an operational planning document distributed in November. Money and staffing needs outlined, the do-or-die determinant for virtually all initiatives in all program planning. Always an uphill – no, an up-mountain effort. Also sought DFAIT support for the proposed – and essentially announced – March 7 2003 gathering in Ottawa of Canadian cultural institutions, meant to focus their attention on Canada-China cultural relations.
Letter to Paul Tellier, congratulating him on his appointment as CEO of Bombardier. I acknowledged BBD’s strategic role in the development of China’s rail and aerospace capacity. The decision-making processes in China frequently had an overtly political dimension: thus, the Canadian government’s interventions vis-à-vis Chinese authorities and advocacy efforts on behalf of Canadian companies were the norm in China.
I repeated my basic message to the Canadian business community: Chinese growth and potential were real and, in all probability, long-lasting and thus each Canadian player had to develop their own objectives and strategies, in accordance with their long term corporate goals and market realities. I also repeated that strategies needed to be both offensive and defensive. I committed Embassy and ConGen support, as I did to all Canadian firms.
Letter to CIDA Minister Susan Whelan regarding her scheduled visit to the PRC during the coming January.
I provided a few comments on her forthcoming visit, stating that the program would provide a good overview of her Department’s development cooperation program and the results it is achieving, including support for the economic reform process, promotion of environmental sustainability, and the strengthening of the elements necessary for good governance, human rights and democratic development to take hold in China. ‘Long term’, I wrote, was very much the operational phrase. While China had made great strides in reducing poverty and raising living standards, life for most Chinese was still a daily struggle and it would take many years before the average Chinese citizen would meet definitions of ‘well-off’ by international standards.
I expressed my view that the Government of China was generally committed to reducing poverty and closing the gap between advanced and less developed regions in the country, but that it was still groping for the most effective ways to deal with the difficult challenge of meeting these goals. Canada’s value-added, in my view, was to work with China on approaches which emphasized people over things, stressing the importance of basic human-resource development and the meaningful inclusion of all groups in society, including women and ethnic minorities. All of which were and are components of the human rights of the Chinese people.
I expressed the view that while human rights remained a sensitive topic in some quarters, there was no question that some progress was being made: while the CCP remained a Leninist monolith – and that in many respects – among the Chinese public and even among some Party members, there was a growing clientele for developing a rights-based society with rule of law. HR had to be looked at from the perspective of both demand and supply: demand indeed was growing, but it was fundamentally important to develop the range of tools, the ‘plumbing’ necessary for a modern, divers and well-governed society. This involved judges, lawyers, and a host of other players developing a professionalism and institution-based outlook which is, for the most part, new to China. This, I was certain, CIDA was helping to provide.
With regard to Canada’s commercial interests in China, I considered that these were best supported by CIDA programs which helped to strengthen the rule of law and build modern institutions.
I also felt that 20 years of CIDA programs in China had created a reservoir of goodwill towards Canada: I saw this as I travelled the country.
Letter to Vice Minister Zhang Baowen, Ministry of Agriculture, regarding his Ministry’s interim procedures for the importation of GMO product, including canola. These procedures put Canadian canola exporters at a serious competitive disadvantage. The letter proposed an alternative procedure and sought an opportunity to discuss the matter further.
I had just learned that the President of China’s Supreme Court, Xiao Yang, would be travelling to Canada in January, and wished to meet – not surprisingly – with Canada’s Chief Justice. I provided Madame McLachlan with a brief update on Rule of Law in the China of 2002:
One of the last issues of the year on our Embassy plate was concern among Canadian mining companies about the evolution of the investment environment in Mongolia. No question that the Government was deeply committed to attracting foreign direct investment in mining, given the key role the international mining industry could play in building the national economy. However, it had recently become evident to Canadian and other foreign mining companies that proposed amendments to Mongolia’s mining law would have negative impacts on the security of tenure for foreign firms. The Canadian firms had passed on their concerns to the Embassy. The potentially positive news, also provided, was to the effect that the Government would be establishing an informal committee, to include representatives from the foreign investment community. So dialogue would be part of the decision making process.
Given the interest of Canadian firms in the decision-making process on terms and conditions for foreign investors including Canadian mining companies, I sent a letter to Prime Minister Enkhbayar, who I had met and conversed in considerable length during my visit to Mongolia, and expected to meet again in the coming year. I wrote that it was commendable that the views of foreign stakeholders will be taken into consideration during this policy process and welcome Mongolia’s desire to do so.
Took a moment to send a note to MFA Vice Minister Li Zhaoxing, thanking him for his contributions to overseeing the Canda-China relationship, and that I looked forward to the next round of bilateral political and security talks with his counterpart, Deputy Minister Gaëtan Lavertu for February of the New Year.
New Year reception and concert hosted by Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan.
As flagged earlier, this again provided privileged seating arrangements at sit-down dinners, as it provided rare opportunities for discussion with FM Tang in Japanese. This was yet another occasion to use what talents you bring to the table, in this case literally, even on a social occasion.
Liberal Parliamentarian Ray Chan served as Secretary of State for Asia Pacific 1993 to 2000, when he lost his Richmond seat. He was returned to Parliament in the 2004 election. Not surprisingly, Raymond and I crossed paths many times. Between 2000 and 2004, Raymond played a number of roles, including assisting Canadian companies seeking advice and counsel on doing business in China. This visit was to introduce me to a BC-based entrepreneur establishing a school for Chinese students in Vancouver.
Letter to Alberta Learning Minister Lyle Oberg as follow-up up his and his delegation’s visit to China to promote education in Alberta among Chinese youth, and the Embassy’s commitment to support their efforts.
…and thus, the Year 2002 comes to an end. And what a fantastic year it had been.